Forgiveness and the Multiple Functions of Anger

Abstract

This paper defends an account of forgiveness that is sensitive to recent work on anger. Like others, we claim anger involves an appraisal, namely that someone has done something wrong. But, we add, anger has two further functions. First, anger communicates to the wrongdoer that her act has been appraised as wrong and demands she feel guilty. This function enables us to explain why apologies make it reasonable to forgo anger and forgive. Second, anger sanctions the wrongdoer for what she has done. This function allows us to explore the moral status of forgiveness, including why forgiveness is typically elective. Forgiveness is a diverse phenomenon. Sometimes it has to do with forgetting or wiping away a transgression (Allais 2008; Rye et al. 2001). Other times it is a matter of forbearing punishment or cancelling a moral debt (Twambley 1976; Warmke 2013, 2016a). And still other times it is connected to seeking reconciliation (Card 2004; Pettigrove 2012, 12–17; Quinn 2004, 222; Roberts 1995, 299). Finally, as a number of scholars have noted, forgiving a person is sometimes about overcoming, letting go of, or forswearing our anger with her for what she has done.1 We will focus our attention on this last account. In particular, although we will vary our language for stylistic reasons, we will construe forgiveness as the act of