{"title":"The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification","authors":"W. Alston","doi":"10.2307/2214077","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The terms, 'justified', 'justification', and their cognates are most naturally understood in what we may term a \"deontological\" way, as having to do with obligation, permission, requirement, blame, and the like. We may think of requirement, prohibition, and permission as the basic deontological terms, with obligation, and duty as species of requirement, and with responsibility, blameworthiness, reproach, praiseworthiness, merit, being in the clear, etc. as normative conse","PeriodicalId":104597,"journal":{"name":"Arguing About Knowledge","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"211","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Arguing About Knowledge","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2307/2214077","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 211
Abstract
The terms, 'justified', 'justification', and their cognates are most naturally understood in what we may term a "deontological" way, as having to do with obligation, permission, requirement, blame, and the like. We may think of requirement, prohibition, and permission as the basic deontological terms, with obligation, and duty as species of requirement, and with responsibility, blameworthiness, reproach, praiseworthiness, merit, being in the clear, etc. as normative conse
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