Information Hierarchies

Benjamin Brooks, A. Frankel, Emir Kamenica
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

If experiment A is Blackwell more informative than experiment B, it is always possible that A and B are induced by signals A′ and B′ such that A′ is a refinement of B′, that is, A′ entails observing B′ plus some additional information. We first show that this result does not extend beyond pairs of experiments: There exist collections of experiments that cannot be induced by a collection of signals so that whenever two experiments are Blackwell ordered, the associated signals are refinement ordered. In other words, sometimes it is impossible for more informed agents to know everything that less informed agents know. More broadly, define an information hierarchy to be a partially ordered set that ranks experiments in terms of informativeness. Is it the case that for any choice of experiments indexed on the hierarchy such that higher experiments are Blackwell more informative, there are signals that induce these experiments with higher signals being refinements of lower signals? We show that the answer is affirmative if and only if the undirected graph of the information hierarchy is a forest.
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信息层次结构
如果实验A比实验B具有更多的布莱克威尔信息,则A和B总是可能受到信号A '和B '的诱导,使得A '是B '的细化,即A '需要观察B '加上一些额外的信息。我们首先表明,这一结果并不超出实验对:存在不能由信号集合诱导的实验集合,因此每当两个实验是布莱克威尔有序的,相关的信号是细化有序的。换句话说,有时候消息灵通的代理不可能知道消息灵通的代理所知道的一切。更广泛地说,将信息层次定义为根据信息量对实验进行排序的部分有序集合。是否存在这样的情况,对于任何在层次上索引的实验的选择,比如更高的实验是布莱克威尔更有信息的,有一些信号诱导这些实验,更高的信号是低信号的细化?我们证明了当且仅当信息层次的无向图是森林时,答案是肯定的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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