Practical Knowledge: Facts, Norms and Phronèsis

Abstract

The chapters of Part II of this book turn to continental-European philosophical hermeneutics, especially as developed by Paul Ricoeur, because his work is rich on the topics of narrative and metaphor, as well as the equitable and the just. They do so to show what the humanities can contribute to the realm of praxis by bringing to the fore the resources that can contribute to the judge’s development of her professional quality of phronèsis, i.e. prudence or practical wisdom, with judicial ethos and habitus included. Chapter 6 deals with the interrelation of facts and (legal) norms in the “application” of law in a specific case, and on the bond of theory and practice. The chapter offers an extended analysis of (Aristotelian) phronèsis (practical wisdom) and épistème (theoretical knowledge) in relation to Ricoeur’s proposal for hermeneutics in law. It argues that iuris prudentia always necessarily combines theoretical knowledge with practical activity.