{"title":"Efficient Tournaments within Teams","authors":"Alex Gershkov, Jianpei Li, Paul Schweinzer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1120483","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We analyze incentive problems in team and partnership structures where the only available information to condition a contract on is a partial and noisy ranking which specifies who comes first in efforts among the competing partners. This enables us to ensure both first-best efficient effort levels for all partners and the redistribution of output only among partners. Our efficiency result is obtained for a wide range of cost and production functions. Copyright (c) 2009, RAND.","PeriodicalId":164119,"journal":{"name":"ORG: Groups & Teams (Topic)","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2008-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"50","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ORG: Groups & Teams (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1120483","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 50
Abstract
We analyze incentive problems in team and partnership structures where the only available information to condition a contract on is a partial and noisy ranking which specifies who comes first in efforts among the competing partners. This enables us to ensure both first-best efficient effort levels for all partners and the redistribution of output only among partners. Our efficiency result is obtained for a wide range of cost and production functions. Copyright (c) 2009, RAND.
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