This case is used in Darden's core Leading Organizations course and is appropriate for MBA, Executive MBA, GEMBA, and executive education programs. The manager of a baby product company's global customer support center observes friction among her staff about the only non-American on the team, whom the others accuse of increasing their call response rate time—thus effectively lowering their pay. When conflict arises on a multicultural team, to what extent can it be attributed to cultural differences and when should a manager become involved? Excerpt UVA-OB-1046 Rev. Jun. 30, 2014 TEAM CONFLICT: THE “CHATTY” ACCUSATION AT THE CUSTOMER SUPPORT CALL CENTER In a rare moment alone in her office, Jennifer Ames reflected on the past 10 years of her career at BabyProduct Corporation (BPC). She could easily chart her successes: She had taken on challenges and produced results where her colleagues had failed; she had increased the diversity of the work force in every unit she had led; she had successfully launched new products and developed several new markets. In fact, just a few months before, Ames had been part of a team that had led a highly successful launch of several BPC product lines into the Latin American market. That success and the ensuing demand for its products drove BPC to centralize customer support in a call center in Austin, Texas—and to create Ames's new position: senior director for global customer support. Ames had studied other call-center models and created a team of four as a prototype for customer support. She had a goal of scaling up as the business expanded. But as she sat in her office, looking at the latest financials and mentally reviewing the events of a disturbing meeting earlier that morning, she saw the failure of her prototype looming large. The call response times were on an upward trajectory that would quickly plunge her budget into the red if the trend continued. Even worse, only one short month into her new position, Ames was worried that her team was stonewalling her. She was deeply troubled by the interaction she had just observed: there was friction among her staff members that was dividing them along American-versus-non-American lines. . . .
{"title":"Team Conflict: The 'Chatty' Accusation at the Customer Support Call Center","authors":"Kristin Behfar, Gerry Yemen, M. Davidson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2974823","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2974823","url":null,"abstract":"This case is used in Darden's core Leading Organizations course and is appropriate for MBA, Executive MBA, GEMBA, and executive education programs. The manager of a baby product company's global customer support center observes friction among her staff about the only non-American on the team, whom the others accuse of increasing their call response rate time—thus effectively lowering their pay. When conflict arises on a multicultural team, to what extent can it be attributed to cultural differences and when should a manager become involved? \u0000Excerpt \u0000UVA-OB-1046 \u0000Rev. Jun. 30, 2014 \u0000TEAM CONFLICT: \u0000THE “CHATTY” ACCUSATION AT THE CUSTOMER SUPPORT CALL CENTER \u0000In a rare moment alone in her office, Jennifer Ames reflected on the past 10 years of her career at BabyProduct Corporation (BPC). She could easily chart her successes: She had taken on challenges and produced results where her colleagues had failed; she had increased the diversity of the work force in every unit she had led; she had successfully launched new products and developed several new markets. In fact, just a few months before, Ames had been part of a team that had led a highly successful launch of several BPC product lines into the Latin American market. That success and the ensuing demand for its products drove BPC to centralize customer support in a call center in Austin, Texas—and to create Ames's new position: senior director for global customer support. Ames had studied other call-center models and created a team of four as a prototype for customer support. She had a goal of scaling up as the business expanded. \u0000But as she sat in her office, looking at the latest financials and mentally reviewing the events of a disturbing meeting earlier that morning, she saw the failure of her prototype looming large. The call response times were on an upward trajectory that would quickly plunge her budget into the red if the trend continued. Even worse, only one short month into her new position, Ames was worried that her team was stonewalling her. She was deeply troubled by the interaction she had just observed: there was friction among her staff members that was dividing them along American-versus-non-American lines. \u0000. . .","PeriodicalId":164119,"journal":{"name":"ORG: Groups & Teams (Topic)","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121793571","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In a real effort lab and online team production experiment we analyze individual effort under different conditions of individual accountability. In a repeated setting workers receive a distorted signal about their co-players’ previous efforts. We vary the degree to which production can be directly traced back to a participant’s individual effort level or nature. We find that individuals produce much less and the decline of contributions over time is significantly steeper under full as compared to no personal accountability. However, in an additional condition, we allow for endogenous accountability and observe the highest output level. We conclude that accountability one step removed makes use of a deterrence effect of potential monitoring but without forcing subjects to learn about their under-performing peers, thus limiting the typical decline of contributions over time.
{"title":"Accountability One Step Removed","authors":"Axel Sonntag, D. J. Zizzo","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2842976","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2842976","url":null,"abstract":"In a real effort lab and online team production experiment we analyze individual effort under different conditions of individual accountability. In a repeated setting workers receive a distorted signal about their co-players’ previous efforts. We vary the degree to which production can be directly traced back to a participant’s individual effort level or nature. We find that individuals produce much less and the decline of contributions over time is significantly steeper under full as compared to no personal accountability. However, in an additional condition, we allow for endogenous accountability and observe the highest output level. We conclude that accountability one step removed makes use of a deterrence effect of potential monitoring but without forcing subjects to learn about their under-performing peers, thus limiting the typical decline of contributions over time.","PeriodicalId":164119,"journal":{"name":"ORG: Groups & Teams (Topic)","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122584065","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Friends can influence many aspects of one’s life, including giving behavior. Using data on 10,000 donors from a field experiment with an online giving community, we examine the effectiveness and underlying motivations for donors to ask friends via social media to give to a charity. Asking a friend in front of his friends is the most effective way to fundraise. Our results suggest that offering a small monetary incentive to donors to ask a friend this way pays for itself by returning about $2 for every $1 spent and could be a potential new fundraising tool for charities. Social pressure, rather than information efficiency, appears to be an important mechanism behind the success of social media in fundraising. However, social pressure is costly and donors are reluctant to use it on their friends. Providing donors with a “gift” for the friend increases solicitation rates.
{"title":"Friends Asking Friends for Charity: The Importance of Gifts and Audience","authors":"M. Castillo, Ragan Petrie, Clarence L. Wardell","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2658294","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2658294","url":null,"abstract":"Friends can influence many aspects of one’s life, including giving behavior. Using data on 10,000 donors from a field experiment with an online giving community, we examine the effectiveness and underlying motivations for donors to ask friends via social media to give to a charity. Asking a friend in front of his friends is the most effective way to fundraise. Our results suggest that offering a small monetary incentive to donors to ask a friend this way pays for itself by returning about $2 for every $1 spent and could be a potential new fundraising tool for charities. Social pressure, rather than information efficiency, appears to be an important mechanism behind the success of social media in fundraising. However, social pressure is costly and donors are reluctant to use it on their friends. Providing donors with a “gift” for the friend increases solicitation rates.","PeriodicalId":164119,"journal":{"name":"ORG: Groups & Teams (Topic)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123964991","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Wallabies is the brand name for the Australian rugby team and is considered one of the key sporting properties in the Australian market. The purpose of this paper is to examine how the employees of the Australian Rugby Union, the organisation responsible for the Wallabies, identify with the sport of rugby and the Wallabies. A survey was undertaken of ARU staff to determine whether their fan identification of the Wallabies was strengthened or weakened as a result of being employed by the ARU. The research found that ARU employee identification with the Wallabies was strengthened as a result of being employed by the ARU. By investing in the employment relationship, by genuinely recognising the value of ARU employees, the ARU can strive to satisfy both employee and consumer partnership. Such an investment in the employees by the ARU is likely to improve the longevity of both the employment and supporter relationship.
{"title":"The Relationship between Team Identification and Organisational Identification: The Case of the Australian Rugby Union","authors":"Winnie M. F. Chan, S. Frawley","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2472808","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2472808","url":null,"abstract":"The Wallabies is the brand name for the Australian rugby team and is considered one of the key sporting properties in the Australian market. The purpose of this paper is to examine how the employees of the Australian Rugby Union, the organisation responsible for the Wallabies, identify with the sport of rugby and the Wallabies. A survey was undertaken of ARU staff to determine whether their fan identification of the Wallabies was strengthened or weakened as a result of being employed by the ARU. The research found that ARU employee identification with the Wallabies was strengthened as a result of being employed by the ARU. By investing in the employment relationship, by genuinely recognising the value of ARU employees, the ARU can strive to satisfy both employee and consumer partnership. Such an investment in the employees by the ARU is likely to improve the longevity of both the employment and supporter relationship.","PeriodicalId":164119,"journal":{"name":"ORG: Groups & Teams (Topic)","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125753228","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We investigate a multi-agent moral-hazard model where agents have expectation-based reference-dependent preferences a la Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). We show that even when each agent's probability of success in a project is independent, team incentives can be optimal. Because the agents are loss averse, they have first-order risk aversion to wage uncertainty. This causes the agents to work harder when their own failure is stochastically compensated through other agents' performance. In the optimal contract, both high- and low-performance agents are equally rewarded if most agents accomplish their projects; otherwise only high-performance agents are rewarded.
{"title":"Team Incentives and Reference-Dependent Preferences","authors":"Kohei Daido, T. Murooka","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1922366","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1922366","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate a multi-agent moral-hazard model where agents have expectation-based reference-dependent preferences a la Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). We show that even when each agent's probability of success in a project is independent, team incentives can be optimal. Because the agents are loss averse, they have first-order risk aversion to wage uncertainty. This causes the agents to work harder when their own failure is stochastically compensated through other agents' performance. In the optimal contract, both high- and low-performance agents are equally rewarded if most agents accomplish their projects; otherwise only high-performance agents are rewarded.","PeriodicalId":164119,"journal":{"name":"ORG: Groups & Teams (Topic)","volume":"136 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123438821","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2009-11-06DOI: 10.1108/09699980911002557
Professor Edward Ochieng, A. Price
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to present literature that suggests that project teams comprising members from culturally diverse backgrounds bring fresh ideas and new approaches to problem solving. The challenge, however, is that they also introduce different understandings and expectations regarding team dynamics and integration. The question becomes how a project manager can effectively work and influence a multicultural construction project team, at the same time being attentive to the diversity and creating the structure required for success.Design/methodology/approach – Using a qualitative methodology, participants of heavy construction engineering projects revealed a number of multi-dimensional factors that either facilitated or limited the effectiveness of multicultural teamwork. These were synthesised into a framework of eight key dimensions that need to be considered when managing multicultural teams. The identified key dimensions include: leadership style, team selection and composition process, cross-cultural management of team development process, cross-cultural communication, cross-cultural collectivism, cross-cultural trust, cross-cultural management and cross-cultural uncertainty.Findings – The proposed framework has implications for construction managers who work with multicultural teams and are committed to improving team performance and productivity. The utilisation of the proposed framework would not instantly transform multicultural teams into high-performing ones; however, it does identify eight key cross-cultural dimensions, which need to be considered.Originality/value – Though the benefits of culturally diverse teams have been acknowledged within the industry, the study highlighted that cultural differences among project teams can cause conflict, misunderstanding and poor project performance.
{"title":"Framework for Managing Multicultural Project Teams","authors":"Professor Edward Ochieng, A. Price","doi":"10.1108/09699980911002557","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/09699980911002557","url":null,"abstract":"Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to present literature that suggests that project teams comprising members from culturally diverse backgrounds bring fresh ideas and new approaches to problem solving. The challenge, however, is that they also introduce different understandings and expectations regarding team dynamics and integration. The question becomes how a project manager can effectively work and influence a multicultural construction project team, at the same time being attentive to the diversity and creating the structure required for success.Design/methodology/approach – Using a qualitative methodology, participants of heavy construction engineering projects revealed a number of multi-dimensional factors that either facilitated or limited the effectiveness of multicultural teamwork. These were synthesised into a framework of eight key dimensions that need to be considered when managing multicultural teams. The identified key dimensions include: leadership style, team selection and composition process, cross-cultural management of team development process, cross-cultural communication, cross-cultural collectivism, cross-cultural trust, cross-cultural management and cross-cultural uncertainty.Findings – The proposed framework has implications for construction managers who work with multicultural teams and are committed to improving team performance and productivity. The utilisation of the proposed framework would not instantly transform multicultural teams into high-performing ones; however, it does identify eight key cross-cultural dimensions, which need to be considered.Originality/value – Though the benefits of culturally diverse teams have been acknowledged within the industry, the study highlighted that cultural differences among project teams can cause conflict, misunderstanding and poor project performance.","PeriodicalId":164119,"journal":{"name":"ORG: Groups & Teams (Topic)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121204131","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2008-12-01DOI: 10.1142/9789812793478_0008
L. Biggiero, E. Sevi
Though the question of the determinants of workgroup performance is one of the most central in organization science, precise theoretical frameworks and formal demonstrations are still missing. In order to fill in this gap the COD agent-based simulation model is here presented and used to study the effects of task interdependence and bounded rationality on workgroup performance. The first relevant finding is an algorithmic demonstration of the ordering of interdependencies in terms of complexity, showing that the parallel mode is the most simplex, followed by the sequential and then by the reciprocal. This result is far from being new in organization science, but what is remarkable is that now it has the strength of an algorithmic demonstration instead of being based on the authoritativeness of some scholar or on some episodic empirical finding. The second important result is that the progressive introduction of realistic limits to agents’ rationality dramatically reduces workgroup performance and addresses to a rather interesting result: when agents’ rationality is severely bounded simple norms work better than complex norms. The third main finding is that when the complexity of interdependence is high, then the appropriate coordination mechanism is agents’ direct and active collaboration, which means teamwork.
{"title":"The COD Model: Simulating Workgroup Performance","authors":"L. Biggiero, E. Sevi","doi":"10.1142/9789812793478_0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/9789812793478_0008","url":null,"abstract":"Though the question of the determinants of workgroup performance is one of the most central in organization science, precise theoretical frameworks and formal demonstrations are still missing. In order to fill in this gap the COD agent-based simulation model is here presented and used to study the effects of task interdependence and bounded rationality on workgroup performance. The first relevant finding is an algorithmic demonstration of the ordering of interdependencies in terms of complexity, showing that the parallel mode is the most simplex, followed by the sequential and then by the reciprocal. This result is far from being new in organization science, but what is remarkable is that now it has the strength of an algorithmic demonstration instead of being based on the authoritativeness of some scholar or on some episodic empirical finding. The second important result is that the progressive introduction of realistic limits to agents’ rationality dramatically reduces workgroup performance and addresses to a rather interesting result: when agents’ rationality is severely bounded simple norms work better than complex norms. The third main finding is that when the complexity of interdependence is high, then the appropriate coordination mechanism is agents’ direct and active collaboration, which means teamwork.","PeriodicalId":164119,"journal":{"name":"ORG: Groups & Teams (Topic)","volume":"180 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132495949","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We analyze incentive problems in team and partnership structures where the only available information to condition a contract on is a partial and noisy ranking which specifies who comes first in efforts among the competing partners. This enables us to ensure both first-best efficient effort levels for all partners and the redistribution of output only among partners. Our efficiency result is obtained for a wide range of cost and production functions. Copyright (c) 2009, RAND.
{"title":"Efficient Tournaments within Teams","authors":"Alex Gershkov, Jianpei Li, Paul Schweinzer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1120483","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1120483","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze incentive problems in team and partnership structures where the only available information to condition a contract on is a partial and noisy ranking which specifies who comes first in efforts among the competing partners. This enables us to ensure both first-best efficient effort levels for all partners and the redistribution of output only among partners. Our efficiency result is obtained for a wide range of cost and production functions. Copyright (c) 2009, RAND.","PeriodicalId":164119,"journal":{"name":"ORG: Groups & Teams (Topic)","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116820594","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper reports and discusses the action research project undertaken by MBA students with respect to actively embodied team learning. The teams undertook a number of consultancy projects for local companies. A range of tools and techniques were employed to promote corporate vision, reflective learning-in-action and to access tacit knowledge. It was seen that the successful teams evolved into micro learning organisations through a staged process of transformation. These stages - based upon models of individual and group development- were related to each other as entwining spirals that complemented, responded to and extended upon each other. We were concerned particularly to map individual and personal development aspects. This model can be employed to improve corporate training and development by inverting the traditional H.E. “pyramid” (of theory first, then knowhow and lastly personal qualities and attitudes). This process is in accord with other recent research concerning management development such as the report of the Torino group, 1998,”Re-designing Management Development in the New Europe.”
{"title":"Tacit Knowledge Collectivized in Teams","authors":"Tom Cockburn, Trefor Lewis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3073958","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3073958","url":null,"abstract":"This paper reports and discusses the action research project undertaken by MBA students with respect to actively embodied team learning. The teams undertook a number of consultancy projects for local companies. A range of tools and techniques were employed to promote corporate vision, reflective learning-in-action and to access tacit knowledge. It was seen that the successful teams evolved into micro learning organisations through a staged process of transformation. These stages - based upon models of individual and group development- were related to each other as entwining spirals that complemented, responded to and extended upon each other. We were concerned particularly to map individual and personal development aspects. This model can be employed to improve corporate training and development by inverting the traditional H.E. “pyramid” (of theory first, then knowhow and lastly personal qualities and attitudes). This process is in accord with other recent research concerning management development such as the report of the Torino group, 1998,”Re-designing Management Development in the New Europe.”","PeriodicalId":164119,"journal":{"name":"ORG: Groups & Teams (Topic)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117090308","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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