Conclusion

Abstract

The chapter recaps the proposed characterization of physical computation and outlines how this characterization squares with the desiderata of an account of computation. The account meets the desideratum of the-right-things-compute in that it deems smartphones, laptops, and robots, as well as natural cognitive and nervous systems, to be computing systems. It meets the desideratum of the-wrong-things-don’t-compute in that it deems stomachs, hurricanes, and rocks, for instance, to be non-computing systems. The proposed account meets a milder objectivity desideratum. It is consistent with the claims that the computational properties of some computing systems, such as brains, are entirely objective and that some computational properties of all computing systems are entirely objective (PO2). The account assigns a distinct feature to computational explanations, namely, modeling, and it emphasizes that the identity conditions that define types of computation (whose specification is the goal of the taxonomy desideratum) are different from those conditions that distinguish computation from non-computation. Finally, it is said how the account fares with Smith’s scope criteria.