Protecting Enclaves from Intra-Core Side-Channel Attacks through Physical Isolation

Marno van der Maas, S. Moore
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

Systems that protect enclaves from privileged software must consider software-based side-channel attacks. Our system isolates enclaves on separate secure cores to stop attackers from running on the same core as the victim, which mitigates intra-core side-channel attacks. Redesigning the memory hierarchy based on enclave ownership protects enclaves against inter-core side-channel attacks. We implement this system and evaluate it in terms of communication performance, memory overhead and hardware area. Combining physical isolation and a redesigned memory hierarchy protects enclaves against all known software-based side-channel attacks.
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通过物理隔离保护飞地免受核心内侧信道攻击
保护飞地免受特权软件攻击的系统必须考虑基于软件的侧信道攻击。我们的系统在单独的安全核上隔离飞地,以阻止攻击者在与受害者相同的核上运行,从而减轻了核内侧信道攻击。基于enclave所有权重新设计内存层次结构可以保护enclave免受核间侧通道攻击。我们实现了该系统,并从通信性能、内存开销和硬件面积等方面对其进行了评价。结合物理隔离和重新设计的内存层次结构可以保护飞地免受所有已知的基于软件的侧信道攻击。
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