On Some Procedures of Forming a Multipartner Alliance

Annelies de Ridder, A. Rusinowska
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引用次数: 25

Abstract

We study two different ways of forming multi-partner alliances between firms with the central idea that procedure is an important factor in multi-partner alliance formation. In the first procedure, an alliance is formed simultaneously, while in the second, step-by-step procedure, members are added one by one. In the model we present, each firm is assumed to have a multidimensional maneuvering space, which consists of all alliance positions acceptable to the firm, and an ideal position in this space. Alliances will form between the firms whose maneuvering spaces overlap. The results of the analysis confirm that procedure is an important factor in multi-partner alliance formation. Nevertheless, if ideal positions of firms are acceptable to all alliance partners, then the result of alliance formation does not depend on procedure. In addition, it is shown that it can be disadvantageous to be a first mover. Finally, we are able to provide sufficient conditions under which one procedure is preferred in a three-partner case. More specifically, a firm with its ideal position acceptable to the two other firms may prefer the simultaneous procedure to being a late mover if (1) there is a certain balance in the firms' degree of flexibility and their power and (2) if the agreed alliance position of the two other firms is acceptable to the firm in question.
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论多伙伴联盟形成的若干程序
本文研究了企业间多伙伴联盟形成的两种不同方式,其中心思想是程序是多伙伴联盟形成的重要因素。在第一个程序中,联盟是同时形成的,而在第二个循序渐进的程序中,成员一个接一个地增加。在我们提出的模型中,假设每个企业都有一个多维的机动空间,该空间由企业可接受的所有联盟位置和该空间中的理想位置组成。在操作空间重叠的公司之间将形成联盟。分析结果证实了程序是影响多伙伴联盟形成的重要因素。然而,如果企业的理想位置为所有联盟伙伴所接受,则联盟形成的结果不依赖于程序。此外,研究还表明,成为先行者可能是不利的。最后,我们能够提供充分的条件下,一个程序是首选的三个合作伙伴的情况下。更具体地说,如果(1)公司的灵活性和权力程度之间存在一定的平衡,并且(2)如果其他两家公司同意的联盟立场对该公司来说是可接受的,那么其理想地位为其他两家公司所接受的公司可能更喜欢同步程序而不是后发者。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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