{"title":"When Does State Interference with Property (Now) Amount to Expropriation? An Analysis of the Agri Sa Court's State Acquisition Requirement (Part I)","authors":"E. Marais","doi":"10.4314/PELJ.V18I1.03","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Section 25 of the Constitution provides two ways in which the state may interfere with property rights, namely deprivation (section 25(1)) and expropriation (section 25(2)). As only the latter requires compensation, there is an incentive for property holders to label any infringement with their property as expropriation in the hope of being compensated for their losses. It is therefore essential to have a principled distinction between deprivation and expropriation, especially given the danger that uncertainty in this regard can hold for legitimate land reform initiatives, which often entail severe limitations on property. This contribution attends to Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC), where the Constitutional Court recently revisited this distinction and held that the distinguishing feature of expropriation is that it entails state acquisition of property. Without state acquisition the interference can (at most) amount to deprivation. Unfortunately, viewing state acquisition as the \"key requirement\" for expropriation is problematic. Firstly, it ignores the true nature of this feature in that it is only a consequence of a valid expropriation rather than a pre-requisite for it – at least in terms of pre-constitutional law. It is therefore inaccurate, concerning both pre- and post-constitutional expropriation case law, to regard acquisition as an indispensable requirement for expropriation. Secondly, limiting the constitutional property inquiry to whether or not the state acquired property appears inadequate as a means of solving difficult cases where the state acquires property pursuant to infringements like taxation and criminal forfeiture. As both these examples result in state acquisition, there must be another explanation of why they do not amount to expropriation. KEYWORDS : expropriation; deprivation; section 25; property clause; state acquisition; constitutional property law; Agri SA case.","PeriodicalId":342854,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Real Property Rights (Topic)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2015-04-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"7","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"LSN: Real Property Rights (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.4314/PELJ.V18I1.03","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
Abstract
Section 25 of the Constitution provides two ways in which the state may interfere with property rights, namely deprivation (section 25(1)) and expropriation (section 25(2)). As only the latter requires compensation, there is an incentive for property holders to label any infringement with their property as expropriation in the hope of being compensated for their losses. It is therefore essential to have a principled distinction between deprivation and expropriation, especially given the danger that uncertainty in this regard can hold for legitimate land reform initiatives, which often entail severe limitations on property. This contribution attends to Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC), where the Constitutional Court recently revisited this distinction and held that the distinguishing feature of expropriation is that it entails state acquisition of property. Without state acquisition the interference can (at most) amount to deprivation. Unfortunately, viewing state acquisition as the "key requirement" for expropriation is problematic. Firstly, it ignores the true nature of this feature in that it is only a consequence of a valid expropriation rather than a pre-requisite for it – at least in terms of pre-constitutional law. It is therefore inaccurate, concerning both pre- and post-constitutional expropriation case law, to regard acquisition as an indispensable requirement for expropriation. Secondly, limiting the constitutional property inquiry to whether or not the state acquired property appears inadequate as a means of solving difficult cases where the state acquires property pursuant to infringements like taxation and criminal forfeiture. As both these examples result in state acquisition, there must be another explanation of why they do not amount to expropriation. KEYWORDS : expropriation; deprivation; section 25; property clause; state acquisition; constitutional property law; Agri SA case.
《宪法》第25条规定了国家干预财产权的两种方式,即剥夺(第25(1)条)和征收(第25(2)条)。由于只有后者需要赔偿,因此财产所有者有动机将其财产的任何侵权行为标记为征用,以期赔偿其损失。因此,必须在原则上区分剥夺和征用,特别是考虑到这方面的不确定性可能对合法的土地改革倡议造成危险,因为这些倡议往往对财产造成严重限制。这一贡献涉及南非农业诉矿产和能源部长2013年4 SA 1 (CC),其中宪法法院最近重新审视了这一区别,并认为征用的显著特征是它需要国家收购财产。没有国家收购,这种干预(最多)就等于剥夺。不幸的是,将国家收购视为征收的“关键条件”是有问题的。首先,它忽略了这一特征的真正性质,因为它只是有效征用的结果,而不是征用的先决条件- -至少就宪法之前的法律而言是这样。因此,就宪法制定前和宪法制定后的征收判例法而言,将征收视为征收不可或缺的条件是不准确的。其次,将宪法财产调查限制在国家是否获得财产上,似乎不足以作为解决国家根据税收和刑事没收等侵权行为获得财产的疑难案件的手段。既然这两个例子都导致了国家收购,那么就必须有另一种解释来解释为什么它们不等于征用。关键词:征收;剥夺;25节;财产条款;国家收购;宪法物权法;农业股份有限公司案例。