{"title":"The Creation of Investor–State Arbitration","authors":"Taylor St. John","doi":"10.1093/LAW/9780198796190.003.0033","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter explores the creation of investor–state arbitration. There\n is no shortage of antecedents for investor–state arbitration. So why is\n it perceived as ‘dramatically different’ from what had gone before? In\n the second half of the twentieth century, consent to investor–state\n arbitration was provided prospectively (before disputes arose) and\n pursuant to generalized jurisdiction (for any treaty breach); this is\n profoundly different from previous practices. Two institutional\n developments were crucial for creating prospective, generalized consent.\n First, the ICSID Convention emerged. Second, provisions providing\n consent to investor–state arbitration were added to investment treaties.\n The chapter then focuses on these two developments. It reconstructs the\n choices that officials faced, their constraints, and the reasons why\n they made the choice for investor–state arbitration against other\n alternatives. To do so, it uses primary documents from five archives:\n the American, British, German, and Swiss national archives as well as\n the World Bank archives.","PeriodicalId":448349,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of International Arbitration","volume":"65 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The Oxford Handbook of International Arbitration","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/LAW/9780198796190.003.0033","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This chapter explores the creation of investor–state arbitration. There
is no shortage of antecedents for investor–state arbitration. So why is
it perceived as ‘dramatically different’ from what had gone before? In
the second half of the twentieth century, consent to investor–state
arbitration was provided prospectively (before disputes arose) and
pursuant to generalized jurisdiction (for any treaty breach); this is
profoundly different from previous practices. Two institutional
developments were crucial for creating prospective, generalized consent.
First, the ICSID Convention emerged. Second, provisions providing
consent to investor–state arbitration were added to investment treaties.
The chapter then focuses on these two developments. It reconstructs the
choices that officials faced, their constraints, and the reasons why
they made the choice for investor–state arbitration against other
alternatives. To do so, it uses primary documents from five archives:
the American, British, German, and Swiss national archives as well as
the World Bank archives.