{"title":"Reflections on Dual Regulation of Securities: A Case Against Preemption","authors":"Manning G. Warren","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1621829","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Congress, urged by the states to fill the “gap” left by their existing regulatory schemes for local securities markets, passed the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Since the enactment of federal legislation, investors in securities have been protected by a dual regulatory system. In recent years, federal and state administrators have commenced efforts to coordinate their respective regulatory schemes in order to reduce any unnecessary obstacles to capital formation without a corresponding reduction in investor protection. Despite the success of the dual regulatory system, it has been subjected to extensive criticism by investment bankers. The primary focus of this criticism is two fold: the absence of uniformity among the federal and state schemes makes compliance difficult and expensive, and the federal and state schemes are needlessly duplicative. Investment bankers have complained that the dual regulatory system’s negative impact on the securities industry far outweighs the benefits to investors. Consequently, it has called for the Securities and Exchange Commission to seek legislation to preempt states from concurrent regulation. Currently, the preemption issue is being used to encourage, if not frighten, the states to adopt uniform regulatory schemes. This article first addresses the judicial, congressional, and executive recognition that has been extended to the states in the field of securities regulation. After reviewing these sources of support for state regulation, a response is made to the claim that duplication and the absence of uniformity have undermined the advantages, if any, of the dual regulatory system. In addressing this criticism, the different regulatory philosophies of the state and federal regulatory schemes and the resulting benefits to investors are explored. This article concludes that the complementary policies inherent in the present system establish a persuasive case against preemption of state securities laws.","PeriodicalId":309706,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Governance Law & Arrangements by Subject Matter (Topic)","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1984-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"CGN: Governance Law & Arrangements by Subject Matter (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1621829","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
Congress, urged by the states to fill the “gap” left by their existing regulatory schemes for local securities markets, passed the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Since the enactment of federal legislation, investors in securities have been protected by a dual regulatory system. In recent years, federal and state administrators have commenced efforts to coordinate their respective regulatory schemes in order to reduce any unnecessary obstacles to capital formation without a corresponding reduction in investor protection. Despite the success of the dual regulatory system, it has been subjected to extensive criticism by investment bankers. The primary focus of this criticism is two fold: the absence of uniformity among the federal and state schemes makes compliance difficult and expensive, and the federal and state schemes are needlessly duplicative. Investment bankers have complained that the dual regulatory system’s negative impact on the securities industry far outweighs the benefits to investors. Consequently, it has called for the Securities and Exchange Commission to seek legislation to preempt states from concurrent regulation. Currently, the preemption issue is being used to encourage, if not frighten, the states to adopt uniform regulatory schemes. This article first addresses the judicial, congressional, and executive recognition that has been extended to the states in the field of securities regulation. After reviewing these sources of support for state regulation, a response is made to the claim that duplication and the absence of uniformity have undermined the advantages, if any, of the dual regulatory system. In addressing this criticism, the different regulatory philosophies of the state and federal regulatory schemes and the resulting benefits to investors are explored. This article concludes that the complementary policies inherent in the present system establish a persuasive case against preemption of state securities laws.
在各州的敦促下,国会通过了1933年的《证券法》和1934年的《证券交易法》,以填补现有的地方证券市场监管计划留下的“空白”。自联邦立法颁布以来,证券投资者一直受到双重监管体系的保护。近年来,联邦和州行政人员已开始努力协调各自的管理计划,以便在不相应减少对投资者保护的情况下减少对资本形成的任何不必要的障碍。尽管双重监管体系取得了成功,但它受到了投资银行家的广泛批评。这种批评主要集中在两个方面:联邦和州计划之间缺乏一致性使得合规变得困难和昂贵,联邦和州计划不必要地重复。投资银行家抱怨称,双重监管体系对证券业的负面影响,远远超过对投资者的好处。因此,它呼吁美国证券交易委员会(Securities and Exchange Commission)寻求立法,以防止各州同时实施监管。目前,先发制人的问题正被用来鼓励(如果不是恐吓的话)各州采用统一的监管方案。本文首先讨论了司法、国会和行政部门在证券监管领域对各州的认可。在回顾了这些支持国家监管的来源之后,对重复和缺乏一致性破坏了双重监管体系的优势(如果有的话)的说法做出了回应。在解决这一批评时,探讨了州和联邦监管计划的不同监管理念以及由此给投资者带来的好处。本文的结论是,现行制度中固有的互补政策为反对国家证券法的优先购买权提供了一个有说服力的案例。