RevProbe: detecting silent reverse proxies in malicious server infrastructures

Antonio Nappa, Rana Faisal Munir, I. Tanoli, C. Kreibich, Juan Caballero
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引用次数: 5

Abstract

Web service operators set up reverse proxies to interpose the communication between clients and origin servers for load-balancing traffic across servers, caching content, and filtering attacks. Silent reverse proxies, which do not reveal their proxy role to the client, are of particular interest since malicious infrastructures can use them to hide the existence of the origin servers, adding an indirection layer that helps protecting origin servers from identification and take-downs. We present RevProbe, a state-of-the-art tool for automatically detecting silent reverse proxies and identifying the server infrastructure behind them. RevProbe uses active probing to send requests to a target IP address and analyzes the responses looking for discrepancies indicating that the IP address corresponds to a reverse proxy. We extensively test RevProbe showing that it significantly outperforms existing tools. Then, we apply RevProbe to perform the first study on the usage of silent reverse proxies in both benign and malicious Web services. RevProbe identifies that 12% of malicious IP addresses correspond to reverse proxies, furthermore 85% of those are silent (compared to 52% for benign reverse proxies).
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RevProbe:检测恶意服务器基础架构中的静默反向代理
Web服务操作员设置反向代理来干预客户机和源服务器之间的通信,以实现跨服务器的负载平衡流量、缓存内容和过滤攻击。沉默的反向代理不会向客户端透露其代理角色,因为恶意的基础设施可以使用它们来隐藏源服务器的存在,从而增加一个间接层,帮助保护源服务器免受识别和关闭。我们介绍RevProbe,一个最先进的工具,用于自动检测沉默的反向代理和识别它们背后的服务器基础设施。RevProbe使用主动探测向目标IP地址发送请求,并分析响应,寻找表明IP地址对应于反向代理的差异。我们对RevProbe进行了广泛的测试,表明它明显优于现有的工具。然后,我们应用RevProbe对良性和恶意Web服务中静默反向代理的使用情况进行了首次研究。RevProbe发现12%的恶意IP地址对应于反向代理,此外,85%的恶意IP地址是沉默的(良性反向代理为52%)。
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