Kıyasın Geçerliliğinde İllet ve Hikmet Tartışmaları

Abstract

In Islamic jurisprudence, there are two categories of legal rule (al- ḥukm al-sharʿi): those that are directly contained in the designations (naṣṣ) and those that are directly contained in the designations and have a common cause. For this reason, it is considered necessary for the mujtahid to reach a conclusion by starting from the designations while deducing a judgement. However, this may not always be easy. Because the cause may not always be mentioned in a designation itself, and the mujtahid may not be able to identify it easily. In fact, it is indisputable that the designations do not contain all legal rules pertaining to public, personal, and family law. This is due to the limiting character of the written law in the face of changing times and conditions. As a result, while some laws are explicitly stated in the designations, others are implicitly stated in texts that may be comprehended through the method of inference (dalalah). In this circumstance, Islamic jurists must solve endless events and problems using a restricted number of designations, which will undoubtedly be difficult. At this point, in addition to the proofs from the Qurʾān, Sunnah, and Ijma' in solving the difficulties that arise, another proof comes to the agenda that can reach the unknown based on the known and generate solutions to new problems, and that is syllogism (qiyās). In Islamic jurisprudence, legal rules are generally divided into two categories: taa’bbudī and ta'līlī. The first is for judgments that, by definition, are not open to ijtihad, because the wisdom of the Shari's grounds for issuing the ruling is unknown. Ta`līlī rulings, on the other hand, are those whose aim and purposes are clearly indicated in the designations and whose reason and wisdom are explicitly expressed in the Scripture, and so provide an open door for ijtihad. In this sense, ta`lil means the determination of the cause of a ruling in the methodology of Islamic jurisprudence and the disclosure of its reasons and wisdom. It is only possible to find solutions to unlimited cases and problems with a limited number of existing narrations through ta`lil. As can be seen from this, determining the causes and wisdom of the designations is critical in Islamic jurisprudence in general, and in the deduction of judgements using syllogism in particular. So, while applying ta'lil to judgments, should wisdom or cause be favoured in the syllogism approach, which is utilized to develop solutions to unknown difficulties based on what is known? In this study, the dictionary and terminological meanings of the concepts of ḥikmah (wisdom) and illah (cause), as well as the comparison and characteristics of the two concepts, are highlighted first, and then the possibility of ta'lil with wisdom is discussed, along with the opinions of the jurists and their justifications. This research is significant in terms of determining whether wisdom may be utilized instead of cause and analyzing various approaches to the problem. Furthermore, classical literature, particularly theses, papers, and articles written on the subject, are used in the study. Classical and modern methods are contrasted in this context. Our scholars, who have adopted the premise that the change of time and the changing of norms cannot be rejected, have contended that wisdom, in addition to the cause, can be called into question in the deduction of judgments. Furthermore, the reality that the cause is being employed much more extensively and producing tangible benefits comes to the fore.