FMEA/CIL implementation for the Space Shuttle new turbopumps

Abstract

To satisfy a reliability requirement which necessitated the implementation of the Space Shuttle high pressure oxidizer turbopump (HPOTP) failure mode effects analysis (FMEA) and critical items list (CIL), Pratt & Whitney (P&W) developed a plan that emphasized the utilization of existing systems and the standardization of subcontractor reporting documentation. Prior to acceptance testing of the first flight HPOTP, an audit of the quality assurance records for all CIL required inspections was performed to determine if the inspections had been made and accepted by quality assurance (QA). 99.9% of the CIL inspections were verified as being successfully completed, far exceeding the 90% NASA verification requirement. This level of compliance was achieved several years sooner and with less than a third the manpower utilized by another contractor's system. The implementation and audit activities uncovered deficiencies that forced quick improvements to inspection methods, documentation and material acceptance practices. Additionally, it reduced the number of government mandatory inspections thus reducing cost and removing potential schedule constraints. Essential to the success of CIL implementation were the analytical procedures used to identify and ensure the test/inspectability of the inspections, testing and process controls (CIL characteristics) performed to minimize the probability of critical part failures.