Going-Concern Opinions in Failing Companies: Auditor Dependence and Opinion Shopping

C. Lennox
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引用次数: 28

Abstract

Contrary to public expectations, companies usually receive clean audit opinions shortly prior to failure. This study examines whether audit reports in failing companies are affected by auditor dependence or opinion shopping. I find audit fees, auditor size, auditor-client tenures and dominant directors are not significantly associated with going-concern opinions. This suggests audit reports are not affected by auditor dependence. I also find companies strategically appoint auditors who are less likely to issue going concern opinions. This suggests failing companies successfully engage in opinion shopping.
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破产公司的持续经营意见:审计师依赖与意见购买
与公众的期望相反,公司通常会在破产前不久收到干净的审计意见。本研究探讨破产公司的审计报告是否受到审计师依赖或意见购物的影响。我发现审计费用、审计师规模、审计客户任期和主导董事与持续经营意见没有显著相关。这表明审计报告不受审计师依赖性的影响。我还发现,公司在战略上任命的审计师不太可能发表持续经营意见。这表明,失败的公司成功地进行了舆论购物。
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