A growing number of sociologists, political scientists, economists, and organizational theorists have invoked the concept of social capital in their search for answers to a broadening range of questions confronting their own fields. Seeking to clarify the concept and help assess its utility for organizational theory, this paper synthesizes the theoretical research undertaken in these various disciplines and develops a common conceptual framework that identifies the sources, benefits, and risks of social capital.
{"title":"Social Capital: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly","authors":"P. Adler, Seok-Woo Kwon","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.186928","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.186928","url":null,"abstract":"A growing number of sociologists, political scientists, economists, and organizational theorists have invoked the concept of social capital in their search for answers to a broadening range of questions confronting their own fields. Seeking to clarify the concept and help assess its utility for organizational theory, this paper synthesizes the theoretical research undertaken in these various disciplines and develops a common conceptual framework that identifies the sources, benefits, and risks of social capital.","PeriodicalId":415084,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Law: Finance & Corporate Governance Law eJournal","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114988492","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper identifies a new corporate governance mechanism: sharing control. We show that bargaining problems among multiple controlling shareholders may prevent inefficient investment decisions that harm minority shareholders. The same bargaining problems may block efficient investment decisions, though. By solving this trade-off, we show that the likelihood that shared control is efficient increases with three firm characteristics: overinvestment problems, the cost of verifying cash flows, and financing requirements. The model provides testable implications for the role that large shareholders play in corporate governance, contrasting shared control and monitoring as alternative governance mechanisms.
{"title":"Sharing of Control as a Corporate Governance Mechanism","authors":"Armando Gomes, Walter Novaes","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.277111","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.277111","url":null,"abstract":"This paper identifies a new corporate governance mechanism: sharing control. We show that bargaining problems among multiple controlling shareholders may prevent inefficient investment decisions that harm minority shareholders. The same bargaining problems may block efficient investment decisions, though. By solving this trade-off, we show that the likelihood that shared control is efficient increases with three firm characteristics: overinvestment problems, the cost of verifying cash flows, and financing requirements. The model provides testable implications for the role that large shareholders play in corporate governance, contrasting shared control and monitoring as alternative governance mechanisms.","PeriodicalId":415084,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Law: Finance & Corporate Governance Law eJournal","volume":"41 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134162884","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A. Pritchard, Stephen P. Ferris, Murali Jagannathan
We examine the number of external appointments held by corporate directors. Directors who serve larger firms and sit on larger boards are more likely to attract directorships. Consistent with Fama and Jensen (1983), we find that firm performance has a positive effect on the number of appointments held by a director. We find no evidence that multiple directors shirk their responsibilities to serve on board committees. We do not find that multiple directors are associated with a greater likelihood of securities fraud litigation. We conclude that the evidence does not support calls for limits on directorships held by an individual. Copyright 2003 by the American Finance Association.
{"title":"Too Busy to Mind the Business? Monitoring by Directors with Multiple Board Appointments","authors":"A. Pritchard, Stephen P. Ferris, Murali Jagannathan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.167288","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.167288","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the number of external appointments held by corporate directors. Directors who serve larger firms and sit on larger boards are more likely to attract directorships. Consistent with Fama and Jensen (1983), we find that firm performance has a positive effect on the number of appointments held by a director. We find no evidence that multiple directors shirk their responsibilities to serve on board committees. We do not find that multiple directors are associated with a greater likelihood of securities fraud litigation. We conclude that the evidence does not support calls for limits on directorships held by an individual. Copyright 2003 by the American Finance Association.","PeriodicalId":415084,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Law: Finance & Corporate Governance Law eJournal","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129697203","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of competition policy - preventing collusive, predatory, and entry-deterring behaviour. Ascending and uniform-price auctions are particularly vulnerable to these problems. The Anglo-Dutch auction - a hybrid of the sealed-bid and ascending auctions - may perform better. Effective antitrust is also critical. Notable fiascoes in auctioning mobile-phone licenses, TV franchises, companies, electricity, etc., and especially the European "third-generation" (UMTS) spectrum auctions, show that everything depends on the details of the context. Auction design is not "one size fits all".
{"title":"What Really Matters in Auction Design","authors":"P. Klemperer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.237114","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.237114","url":null,"abstract":"The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of competition policy - preventing collusive, predatory, and entry-deterring behaviour. Ascending and uniform-price auctions are particularly vulnerable to these problems. The Anglo-Dutch auction - a hybrid of the sealed-bid and ascending auctions - may perform better. Effective antitrust is also critical. Notable fiascoes in auctioning mobile-phone licenses, TV franchises, companies, electricity, etc., and especially the European \"third-generation\" (UMTS) spectrum auctions, show that everything depends on the details of the context. Auction design is not \"one size fits all\".","PeriodicalId":415084,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Law: Finance & Corporate Governance Law eJournal","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121468897","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper investigates how different legal frameworks not only affect the amount of external financing available, but also the allocation of resources among different type of assets. Using a simple model, we show that a firm will get less financing, and thus invest less, in a weak law and order environment. We also show that weaker property rights can lead to an asset substitution effect with firms investing less in intangible assets. Empirically, these two effects appear to be equally important drivers of growth in sectoral value added for a large number of countries. Using individual firm data, we also show that weaker legal frameworks are associated with relatively more fixed assets, but less long-term financing for a given amount of fixed assets.
{"title":"Law, Property Rights and Growth","authors":"S. Claessens, L. Laeven","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.270644","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.270644","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates how different legal frameworks not only affect the amount of external financing available, but also the allocation of resources among different type of assets. Using a simple model, we show that a firm will get less financing, and thus invest less, in a weak law and order environment. We also show that weaker property rights can lead to an asset substitution effect with firms investing less in intangible assets. Empirically, these two effects appear to be equally important drivers of growth in sectoral value added for a large number of countries. Using individual firm data, we also show that weaker legal frameworks are associated with relatively more fixed assets, but less long-term financing for a given amount of fixed assets.","PeriodicalId":415084,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Law: Finance & Corporate Governance Law eJournal","volume":"130 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114126650","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this article, I address the tax consequences to U.S. investors from mergers between foreign corporations. The combination of the increasingly international capital markets and the global merger movement has highlighted the inequity of Treasury's current stance to deny such transactions the benefit of tax-free reorganization status under Section 368(a)(1)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code. The article argues that permitting foreign mergers to qualify as "A" reorganizations is faithful to the original intent of 368(a)(1)(A) and uses this historical perspective to provide a framework for developing a federal tax law definition of "merger or consolidation." The article concludes that broadly applying such a tax-centered conception of the phrase can also help resolve the inequity between foreign and domestic transactions.
{"title":"A Transcontinental 'a' Train? Foreign Mergers Under Section 368(A)(1)(A)","authors":"Steven A. Bank","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.268642","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.268642","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, I address the tax consequences to U.S. investors from mergers between foreign corporations. The combination of the increasingly international capital markets and the global merger movement has highlighted the inequity of Treasury's current stance to deny such transactions the benefit of tax-free reorganization status under Section 368(a)(1)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code. The article argues that permitting foreign mergers to qualify as \"A\" reorganizations is faithful to the original intent of 368(a)(1)(A) and uses this historical perspective to provide a framework for developing a federal tax law definition of \"merger or consolidation.\" The article concludes that broadly applying such a tax-centered conception of the phrase can also help resolve the inequity between foreign and domestic transactions.","PeriodicalId":415084,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Law: Finance & Corporate Governance Law eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130512906","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper was written specifically for the OECD Third Asian Roundtable on Corporate Governance, held in Singapore in April 2001, the theme of which was "the Role of Boards and Stakeholders in Corporate Governance". It goes without saying that a significant part of corporate governance is about managerial control and accountability. The duties imposed on directors, how Board members are chosen, Board composition, the interaction between members, the roles and responsibilities that Boards undertake, both as a whole and by their individual members, all have significant impact on the efficacy and propriety of the Board in fulfilling its functions. This paper discusses the regulatory environment within which Boards of listed companies in Singapore operate. It summarises the duties, roles and responsibilities imposed on and undertaken by Boards and directors in Singapore and highlights key aspects of Board processes and practices. Some empirical data is presented and the latest developments in corporate governance in Singapore and spearheaded by the relevant regulatory authorities are also highlighted.
{"title":"The Role of Boards and Stakeholders in Corporate Governance in Singapore","authors":"V. C. Yeo, Pearlie M. C. Koh","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.268077","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.268077","url":null,"abstract":"This paper was written specifically for the OECD Third Asian Roundtable on Corporate Governance, held in Singapore in April 2001, the theme of which was \"the Role of Boards and Stakeholders in Corporate Governance\". It goes without saying that a significant part of corporate governance is about managerial control and accountability. The duties imposed on directors, how Board members are chosen, Board composition, the interaction between members, the roles and responsibilities that Boards undertake, both as a whole and by their individual members, all have significant impact on the efficacy and propriety of the Board in fulfilling its functions. This paper discusses the regulatory environment within which Boards of listed companies in Singapore operate. It summarises the duties, roles and responsibilities imposed on and undertaken by Boards and directors in Singapore and highlights key aspects of Board processes and practices. Some empirical data is presented and the latest developments in corporate governance in Singapore and spearheaded by the relevant regulatory authorities are also highlighted.","PeriodicalId":415084,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Law: Finance & Corporate Governance Law eJournal","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132035315","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper analyzes the origins, persistence, and current evolution of a series of non-legal rules (or "norms") that have played an important role in Japanese corporate governance. The four central features of the governance environment examined here include: 1) the main bank system, in which banks voluntarily restructure loans to some distressed borrowers, 2) a social distaste for hostile takeovers, 3) implicit promises of employment stability, and 4) belief systems about the proper role and structure of the board of directors. I show that, despite virtually ubiquitous claims to the contrary, these norms do not enjoy a long history of practice in Japan, but rather emerged only in the immediate postwar period. I hypothesize that they emerged for two reasons: First, they served as a low-cost substitute for a troubled formal institutional environment beset by the "transplant effect" that imperils legal reform in transition economies today. Second, they provided private benefits to the small number of interest groups that emerged intact from World War II. The flow of private benefits to norm adherents explains the persistence of the norms despite clear evidence of their inefficiency over the past decade. I demonstrate that current models of norm reform, which emphasize the role of exogenous shocks, the workings of norm entrepreneurs, and increased information, explain why the norms of Japanese corporate governance are currently evolving. Finally, extrapolating from Japan's experience, I suggest how norm analysis can contribute to the two most pressing questions in comparative corporate governance today: whether law matters to corporate governance, and whether diverse systems of corporate governance are converging toward the Anglo-American model. As to both questions, I suggest that closer attention to norms reveals shortcomings in the existing literature.
{"title":"Creative Norm Destruction: The Evolution of Nonlegal Rules in Japanese Corporate Governance","authors":"C. Milhaupt","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.264202","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.264202","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes the origins, persistence, and current evolution of a series of non-legal rules (or \"norms\") that have played an important role in Japanese corporate governance. The four central features of the governance environment examined here include: 1) the main bank system, in which banks voluntarily restructure loans to some distressed borrowers, 2) a social distaste for hostile takeovers, 3) implicit promises of employment stability, and 4) belief systems about the proper role and structure of the board of directors. I show that, despite virtually ubiquitous claims to the contrary, these norms do not enjoy a long history of practice in Japan, but rather emerged only in the immediate postwar period. I hypothesize that they emerged for two reasons: First, they served as a low-cost substitute for a troubled formal institutional environment beset by the \"transplant effect\" that imperils legal reform in transition economies today. Second, they provided private benefits to the small number of interest groups that emerged intact from World War II. The flow of private benefits to norm adherents explains the persistence of the norms despite clear evidence of their inefficiency over the past decade. I demonstrate that current models of norm reform, which emphasize the role of exogenous shocks, the workings of norm entrepreneurs, and increased information, explain why the norms of Japanese corporate governance are currently evolving. Finally, extrapolating from Japan's experience, I suggest how norm analysis can contribute to the two most pressing questions in comparative corporate governance today: whether law matters to corporate governance, and whether diverse systems of corporate governance are converging toward the Anglo-American model. As to both questions, I suggest that closer attention to norms reveals shortcomings in the existing literature.","PeriodicalId":415084,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Law: Finance & Corporate Governance Law eJournal","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127981338","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We analyze several hundred firms that expand via acquisition and0or increase their number of business segments. The combined market reaction to acquisition announcements is positive but acquiring firm excess values decline after the diversifying event. Much of the excess value reduction occurs because our sample firms acquire already discounted business units, and not because diversifying destroys value. This implies that the standard assumption that conglomerate divisions can be benchmarked to typical stand-alone f irms should be carefully reconsidered. We also show that excess value does not decline when firms increase their number of business segments because of pure reporting changes. DOES CORPORATE DIVERSIF ICATION destroy value? Several recent papers attempt to answer this question by comparing the market value of firms that operate multiple lines of business to the value of a portfolio of stand-alone firms operating in the same industries as the conglomerate’s divisions. Lang and Stulz ~1994! use this approach and find that multisegment firms have low values of Tobin’s q compared to stand-alone firms. Similarly, Berger and Ofek ~1995! find that U.S. conglomerates are priced at a mean discount of about 15 percent. Lins and Servaes ~1999! find similar discounts in Japan and the United Kingdom. Indeed, based on the Berger and Ofek methodology, diversified firms with valuation discounts had aggregate value losses of $800 billion in 1995. The magnitude of the value loss suggests that operating the divisions of conglomerates as stand-alone firms would create significant value. In this paper, we provide new evidence on whether the act of corporate diversification destroys value, or whether the divisions that make up conglomerates would trade at a discount, even if they operated as standalone firms.
我们分析了数百家通过收购扩张或增加业务部门数量的公司。市场对收购公告的综合反应是积极的，但收购公司的超额价值在多元化事件后下降。大部分超额价值的减少是因为我们的样本公司收购了已经打折的业务单位，而不是因为多元化破坏了价值。这意味着，企业集团部门可以作为典型独立公司的基准的标准假设应该被仔细地重新考虑。我们还表明，当公司增加业务部门数量时，由于单纯的报告变化，超额价值并不会下降。公司多元化会破坏价值吗?最近的几篇论文试图通过比较经营多种业务的公司的市场价值与经营同一行业的独立公司的投资组合的价值来回答这个问题。Lang and Stulz ~1994!使用这种方法，你会发现多部门公司的托宾q值比独立公司低。同样，Berger和Ofek ~1995!发现美国大型企业的股价平均折让约15%。Lins和Servaes ~1999!在日本和英国也有类似的折扣。事实上，根据伯杰和欧菲克的方法，估值折扣的多元化公司在1995年总共损失了8000亿美元的价值。价值损失的幅度表明，将企业集团的各个部门作为独立公司运营将创造巨大的价值。在本文中，我们提供了新的证据，证明公司多元化行为是否会破坏价值，或者组成企业集团的部门是否会以折扣价交易，即使它们作为独立公司运营。
{"title":"Does Corporate Diversification Destroy Value?","authors":"J. Graham, M. Lemmon, Jack G. Wolf","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.199709","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.199709","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze several hundred firms that expand via acquisition and0or increase their number of business segments. The combined market reaction to acquisition announcements is positive but acquiring firm excess values decline after the diversifying event. Much of the excess value reduction occurs because our sample firms acquire already discounted business units, and not because diversifying destroys value. This implies that the standard assumption that conglomerate divisions can be benchmarked to typical stand-alone f irms should be carefully reconsidered. We also show that excess value does not decline when firms increase their number of business segments because of pure reporting changes. DOES CORPORATE DIVERSIF ICATION destroy value? Several recent papers attempt to answer this question by comparing the market value of firms that operate multiple lines of business to the value of a portfolio of stand-alone firms operating in the same industries as the conglomerate’s divisions. Lang and Stulz ~1994! use this approach and find that multisegment firms have low values of Tobin’s q compared to stand-alone firms. Similarly, Berger and Ofek ~1995! find that U.S. conglomerates are priced at a mean discount of about 15 percent. Lins and Servaes ~1999! find similar discounts in Japan and the United Kingdom. Indeed, based on the Berger and Ofek methodology, diversified firms with valuation discounts had aggregate value losses of $800 billion in 1995. The magnitude of the value loss suggests that operating the divisions of conglomerates as stand-alone firms would create significant value. In this paper, we provide new evidence on whether the act of corporate diversification destroys value, or whether the divisions that make up conglomerates would trade at a discount, even if they operated as standalone firms.","PeriodicalId":415084,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Law: Finance & Corporate Governance Law eJournal","volume":"135 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129508528","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Combining an agency perspective, a resource-based view and upper echelon research, this paper examines inter-links between executive characteristics, board structure and share ownership, and short-term performance of firms in a sample of initial public offerings (IPOs) in the UK. It argues that the IPO process presents a unique combination of agency relationships between the firm's executive and non-executive directors, IPO's advisors and underwriters, and outside investors. Board structure, diversity and ownership may be used strategically by the IPO's team to reduce potential agency costs. It shows that, in line with the predictions of a proposed theoretical model, board diversity and share ownership of non-executive directors are negatively associated with experience and share ownership of executive directors. Board diversity and executive share ownership are associated with better IPO performance measured in terms of share offer 'underpricing'.
{"title":"Resource and Strategy Roles of Corporate Governance and Stockmarket Response: An Investigation of Initial Public Offerings in the UK, 1999-2000","authors":"I. Filatotchev, Kate Bishop","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.277629","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.277629","url":null,"abstract":"Combining an agency perspective, a resource-based view and upper echelon research, this paper examines inter-links between executive characteristics, board structure and share ownership, and short-term performance of firms in a sample of initial public offerings (IPOs) in the UK. It argues that the IPO process presents a unique combination of agency relationships between the firm's executive and non-executive directors, IPO's advisors and underwriters, and outside investors. Board structure, diversity and ownership may be used strategically by the IPO's team to reduce potential agency costs. It shows that, in line with the predictions of a proposed theoretical model, board diversity and share ownership of non-executive directors are negatively associated with experience and share ownership of executive directors. Board diversity and executive share ownership are associated with better IPO performance measured in terms of share offer 'underpricing'.","PeriodicalId":415084,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Law: Finance & Corporate Governance Law eJournal","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125109625","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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