Government Equity Investments in Coronavirus Bailouts: Why, How, When?

W. Megginson, Veljko Fotak
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引用次数: 15

Abstract

Governments around the world are attempting to support individuals’ incomes, rescue distressed businesses, and preserve employer-employee relationships damaged in the coronavirus pandemic by adopting fiscal stimulus programs of unprecedented scale. Although the bulk of this spending will involve direct payments to individuals or some type of direct lending or loan guarantees to businesses, large sums will (and should) take the form of government purchases of equity in distressed firms — either by direct purchase or by exercising warrants attached to rescue loans. We discuss why we think these equity injections will be necessary, but only in a limited number of cases; how they should be structured; when investments should be made and, almost as important, exited. We summarize (and tabulate) both the modest recent history of governments rescuing non-financial firms with equity injections and the voluminous research examining the efficacy of governments rescuing failing banks using equity investments. We highlight the dangers that would likely arise if governments permanently retain and vote the equity stakes purchased during the current crisis. Where equity investments must be made, we argue that these should: (1) be effective, in being large enough to be decisive; (2) be passive after the initial injection, when some financial restrictions should be imposed; (3) be temporary and preferably self-liquidating through open-market sales or redemptions; (4) provide taxpayers an upside claim if and when the rescued firm recovers; (5) be restricted to exchange-listed companies in all but extreme cases; and (6) be timely, as speed is crucial. In most cases, the default instrument to employ should be either non-voting preferred stock or warrants that convert into immediately marketable common shares, and we present a numerical example of how a preferred stock-with-warrants equity investment could pay off handsomely for taxpayers if rescued companies recover even partially.
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政府对冠状病毒救助的股权投资:为什么,如何,何时?
世界各国政府正试图通过采取规模空前的财政刺激计划,支持个人收入,拯救陷入困境的企业,并维护在冠状病毒大流行中受损的劳资关系。尽管这些支出的大部分将涉及直接支付给个人,或向企业提供某种形式的直接贷款或贷款担保,但大量资金将(也应该)采取政府购买陷入困境企业股权的形式——要么直接购买,要么行使与救助贷款相关的认股权证。我们讨论了为什么我们认为这些股权注入是必要的,但只是在有限的情况下;它们应该如何构建;什么时候应该进行投资,什么时候应该退出,这一点同样重要。我们总结(并制作表格)了政府通过股权注入拯救非金融公司的历史,以及大量研究政府通过股权投资拯救濒临倒闭的银行的有效性。我们强调,如果政府永久保留在当前危机期间购买的股权并对其进行表决,可能会出现的危险。在必须进行股权投资的地方,我们认为这些投资应该:(1)有效,规模要大到足以起到决定性作用;(2)初始注入后处于被动状态,此时应施加一些资金限制;(三)临时性的,最好是通过公开市场出售或者赎回实现自我清偿;(4)当被救助企业恢复元气时,为纳税人提供一种上行权利要求;(5)除极端情况外,仅限于交易所上市公司;(6)及时,因为速度是至关重要的。在大多数情况下,使用的默认工具应该是无投票权的优先股或转换为可立即上市普通股的认股权证,我们给出了一个数字例子,说明如果被救助的公司即使部分复苏,优先股与认股权证的股权投资如何为纳税人带来可观的回报。
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