Multimarket Lobbying with Reserves

Oz Shy
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Abstract This article presents a model of two firms with fixed budgets that simultaneously hire lobbyists to obtain exclusive contracts in multiple markets. In a pure-strategy equilibrium, neither firm can increase its payoff by using its reserves to hire more lobbyists in any market. Efficiency criterion is defined in order to facilitate the ranking of lobbyist allocations with the same payoffs, where efficiency is improved with the aggregate number of lobbyists that firms keep on reserve. Efficiency comparisons are used to reduced the number of pure-strategy equilibria.
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有储备的多市场游说
摘要本文提出了两家预算固定的公司同时雇佣游说者在多个市场获得排他性合同的模型。在纯战略均衡中,两家公司都不能通过在任何市场使用其储备雇佣更多游说者来增加收益。效率标准的定义是为了促进具有相同收益的游说者分配的排序,其中效率随着公司保留的游说者总数的增加而提高。效率比较用于减少纯策略均衡的数量。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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