Aging and Social Justice: A Phenomenological Investigation

Zachary G. Davis
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

The rapidly aging populations of the post-industrial countries is forcing to what amounts to a type of paradigm shift in the concept of the welfare state. Not only must the distribution of goods and services be re-calibrated to adjust to an older population, but the entire dynamic of the social as well. Present and past conditions of the welfare state have not been favorable to the aged, particularly for older women, minorities, and the poor. (1) Social and institutional practices of age discrimination continue to serve as means to impoverish persons economically, politically and existentially. The type of shift the welfare state undergoes will determine the extent to which social injustice grows with its aging population. There is no concept more elemental to aging than the concept of time. It is how age is measured and as such functions as the fulcrum for social division, categorization, and, consequently, social injustice. How the welfare state adjusts to its aging populations is conditioned by its standard of time. In this paper, I show how a phenomenological investigation of the experience of aging disrupts the standardization of time. Rather than reduce all temporal experience to the same, a phenomenological description recognizes that every age has its own time and integrity. Part 1 of this study describes how time consciousness is transformed by the experience of aging, demonstrating the unique and heterogeneous quality of one's life time. Part 2 suggests how phenomenology can function as a type of critical gerontology in examining the management and production of discrimination in the time of aging. I. The Experience of Aging and the Structure of Time-Consciousness Aging may in fact be as natural to us as death, but it is certainly an experience of which we are much more familiar. Unlike death, getting older is not an alien or impossible experience, but something we experience directly in every moment of our lives. Despite the relative proximity between death and aging, aging has been an experience generally ignored in the philosophical and phenomenological traditions. (2) A central factor contributing to this prejudice is the presupposition that time has an essential and universal structure that remains identical throughout the course of one's life time. A critical description of the experience of aging calls this presupposition into question. Because aging is a process often attributed exclusively to the body, we often find ourselves describing the process of aging in biological terms such as the breakdown or steady exhaustion of the body. Yet, biological descriptions of this type are not the descriptions of aging, but rather descriptions of being aged. Children, for example, exhibit a keen sense of getting older, while at the same time enjoying an increase in biological capacity and power. The physical body may serve as an external sign or evidence of aging and as a consequence become a part of the experience of aging. It is however, not our originary and fundamental experience. An aging body can only serve as evidence for aging when we know already what it means to age. (3) Max Scheler was the first phenomenologist to address the experience of aging and understood the problem of aging to be a problem of time, not of the body. His analysis begins with the epistemological question, what accounts for our certainty of aging, the certainty that we are getting older? (4) As a means to answer this question, he asks us to imagine the case wherein we have never perceived or had any contact with the aging of another person or living being. Would we still be certain that we are getting older? And what if we were to imagine that we had never experienced perceptually or otherwise any decline in our own bodies? Would we still be certain of ourselves as aging? For Scheler, the answer to this series of questioning comes in the affirmative. The intent behind this experiment is to direct us to what Scheler calls the structure of the inner consciousness of the life process. …
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老龄化与社会正义:现象学研究
后工业化国家人口的迅速老龄化迫使福利国家的概念发生了一种范式转变。不仅商品和服务的分配必须重新调整,以适应人口老龄化,而且整个社会的动态也必须重新调整。福利国家现在和过去的状况对老年人都不利,特别是对老年妇女、少数民族和穷人。(1)年龄歧视的社会和体制做法继续是使人在经济、政治和生存方面陷入贫困的手段。福利国家所经历的转变类型将决定随着人口老龄化社会不公的程度。对于衰老来说,没有比时间概念更基本的概念了。它是衡量年龄的方式,也是社会划分、分类以及社会不公的支点。福利国家如何适应人口老龄化取决于它的时间标准。在这篇论文中,我展示了对衰老经验的现象学研究如何扰乱了时间的标准化。现象学的描述不是将所有的时间经验简化为相同的,而是认识到每个时代都有自己的时间和完整性。本研究的第一部分描述了时间意识是如何通过衰老的经历而转变的,展示了一个人的生命时间的独特和异质性。第2部分建议现象学如何作为一种关键的老年学来检查老龄化时期歧视的管理和产生。事实上,衰老对我们来说可能像死亡一样自然,但它肯定是一种我们更为熟悉的经历。与死亡不同,变老不是一种陌生的或不可能的经历,而是我们生活中每时每刻都在直接经历的事情。尽管死亡和衰老之间的相对接近,但在哲学和现象学传统中,衰老一直是一种通常被忽视的经验。(2)造成这种偏见的一个主要因素是这样一种假设,即时间有一个基本的、普遍的结构,在人的一生中保持不变。对衰老经历的批判性描述对这一假设提出了质疑。因为衰老是一个通常只归因于身体的过程,我们经常发现自己用生物学术语来描述衰老的过程,比如身体的崩溃或持续衰竭。然而,这种类型的生物学描述不是对衰老的描述,而是对衰老的描述。例如,儿童表现出一种敏锐的变老感,同时享受着生物能力和力量的增长。身体可以作为衰老的外部标志或证据,并因此成为衰老经验的一部分。然而,这并不是我们最初的和基本的经验。只有当我们已经知道衰老意味着什么时,衰老的身体才能作为衰老的证据。(3)马克斯·舍勒是第一位探讨衰老经验的现象学家,他认为衰老问题是时间问题,而不是身体问题。他的分析从认识论的问题开始,是什么解释了我们对衰老的确定性,我们正在变老的确定性?(4)为了回答这个问题,他让我们想象这样一种情况,在这种情况下,我们从未察觉或接触过另一个人或生物的衰老。我们还能确定自己在变老吗?如果我们想象自己的身体从未经历过知觉上或其他方面的衰退呢?我们还能确定自己在变老吗?对于谢勒来说,这一系列问题的答案是肯定的。这个实验背后的意图是引导我们进入舍勒所说的生命过程的内在意识结构。…
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