Judgment and Decision Making

P. Brust-Renck, Rebecca B Weldon, V. Reyna
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

Everyday life is comprised of a series of decisions, from choosing what to wear to deciding what major to declare in college and whom to share a life with. Modern era economic theories were first brought into psychology in the 1950s and 1960s by Ward Edwards and Herbert Simon. Simon suggested that individuals do not always choose the best alternative among the options because they are bounded by cognitive limitations (e.g., memory). People who choose the good-enough option “satisfice” rather than optimize, because they are bounded by their limited time, knowledge, and computational capacity. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky were among those who took the next step by demonstrating that individuals are not only limited but are inconsistent in their preferences, and hence irrational. Describing a series of biases and fallacies, they elaborated intuitive strategies (i.e., heuristics) that people tend to use when faced with difficult questions (e.g., “What proportion of long-distance relationships break up within a year?”) by answering based on simpler, similar questions (e.g., “Do instances of swift breakups of long-distance relationships come readily to mind?”). More recently, the emotion-versus-reason debate has been incorporated into the field as an approach to how judgments can be governed by two fundamentally different processes, such as intuition (or affect) and reasoning (or deliberation). A series of dual-process approaches by Seymour Epstein, George Lowenstein, Elke Weber, Paul Slovic, and Ellen Peters, among others, attempt to explain how a decision based on emotional and/or impulsive judgments (i.e., system 1) should be distinguished from those that are based on a slow process that is governed by rules of reasoning (i.e., system 2). Valerie Reyna and Charles Brainerd and other scholars take a different approach to dual processes and propose a theory—fuzzy-trace theory—that incorporates many of the prior theoretical elements but also introduces the novel concept of gist mental representations of information (i.e., essential meaning) shaped by culture and experience. Adding to processes of emotion or reward sensitivity and reasoning or deliberation, fuzzy-trace theory characterizes gist as insightful intuition (as opposed to crude system 1 intuition) and contrasts it with verbatim or precise processing that does not consist of meaningful interpretation. Some of these new perspectives explain classic paradoxes and predict new effects that allow us to better understand human judgment and decision making. More recent contributions to the field include research in neuroscience, in particular from neuroeconomics.
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判断和决策
每天的生活都是由一系列的决定组成的,从选择穿什么到决定在大学里选什么专业,再到决定和谁一起生活。在20世纪50年代和60年代,沃德·爱德华兹(Ward Edwards)和赫伯特·西蒙(Herbert Simon)首次将现代经济理论引入心理学。西蒙认为,个体并不总是在选项中选择最佳选项,因为他们受到认知限制(例如,记忆)的限制。选择“足够好”选项的人“满足”而不是优化,因为他们受限于有限的时间、知识和计算能力。丹尼尔·卡尼曼(Daniel Kahneman)和阿莫斯·特沃斯基(Amos Tversky)等人进一步证明,个人的偏好不仅有限,而且不一致,因此是非理性的。他们描述了一系列的偏见和谬论,详细阐述了人们在面对难题时倾向于使用的直觉策略(即启发式)(例如,“一年内远距离恋情破裂的比例是多少?”),通过回答更简单、类似的问题(例如,“远距离恋情迅速分手的例子是否很容易浮现在脑海中?”)。最近,情感与理性的争论已经被纳入该领域,作为一种方法来研究判断如何被两个根本不同的过程所支配,比如直觉(或情感)和推理(或审议)。西摩·爱泼斯坦、乔治·洛温斯坦、埃尔克·韦伯、保罗·斯洛维奇和艾伦·彼得斯等人提出了一系列双过程方法,试图解释如何区分基于情绪和/或冲动判断(即系统1)的决策,以及基于受推理规则支配的缓慢过程的决策(即:瓦莱丽·雷纳和查尔斯·布雷纳德等学者对双重过程采取了不同的方法,提出了一种理论——模糊痕迹理论——它融合了许多先前的理论元素,但也引入了文化和经验形成的信息(即本质意义)的主要心理表征的新概念。除了情感、奖励、敏感、推理或思考的过程之外,模糊追踪理论将主旨描述为有洞察力的直觉(与粗糙的系统1直觉相反),并将其与逐字逐句或不包含有意义的解释的精确处理进行对比。其中一些新观点解释了经典的悖论,并预测了新的影响,使我们能够更好地理解人类的判断和决策。该领域最近的贡献包括神经科学的研究,特别是神经经济学的研究。
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