{"title":"Signalling and jump bidding in takeover auctions","authors":"Anna Dodonova","doi":"10.1080/17446540701367469","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This article generalizes the model of Dodonova and Khoroshilov (2006) who argues that there are no signalling equilibria in takeover auctions.","PeriodicalId":345744,"journal":{"name":"Applied Financial Economics Letters","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2008-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Applied Financial Economics Letters","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17446540701367469","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Abstract
This article generalizes the model of Dodonova and Khoroshilov (2006) who argues that there are no signalling equilibria in takeover auctions.
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