Spend Money to Make Money?: Voluntary Audit Reviews and Firms’ Cost of Debt

Vlad‐Andrei Porumb, Yasemin Karaibrahimoglu, Shuo Wang
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

An audit review (AR) is a mechanism used by boards to assess the quality of interim financial reports on a timely basis. In this study, we analyze whether the voluntary purchase of an AR reduces the screening costs of lenders and translates into lower cost of debt for borrowers. We use a sample of 8,021 firm-year observations from 1,678 public firms in Canada over the period 2004-2015 to test this prediction. The results suggest that firms with voluntary ARs have a lower cost of debt than firms with no AR. Further analyses using samples of public bonds and private loans corroborate our findings. Cross-sectional analyses suggest that, for borrowers with higher information asymmetry, the impact of voluntary ARs is incrementally stronger only for public debt. Our study is the first to document that the voluntary purchase of ARs caters to lenders’ informational needs and benefits listed borrowers through a lower cost of debt financing.
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花钱是为了赚钱?:自愿审计审查和公司债务成本
审计复核是董事会用来及时评估中期财务报告质量的一种机制。在本研究中,我们分析了自愿购买应收帐款是否降低了贷款人的筛选成本,并转化为借款人的债务成本降低。我们使用了2004-2015年期间来自加拿大1678家上市公司的8021个公司年观察样本来检验这一预测。结果表明,自愿偿还债务的公司比没有偿还债务的公司的债务成本更低。使用公共债券和私人贷款样本的进一步分析证实了我们的发现。横断面分析表明,对于信息不对称程度较高的借款人,自愿减记的影响仅对公共债务的影响逐渐增强。我们的研究首次证明,自愿购买抵押贷款满足了贷款人的信息需求,并通过较低的债务融资成本使借款人受益。
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