{"title":"A 'Truly Sequential' Resolution to Chainstore Paradox","authors":"Bryce M. Kim","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2807682","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper resolves the chainstore paradox by viewing each game of a monopolist against a single competitor as a sequential game. Every game is done under perfect and complete information. In this sequential game, with subgame perfection imposed, the number of sequential stages - even or odd - matter greatly for the resulting equilibrium, with odd supporting the deterrence theory equilibrium and even supporting the induction theory equilibrium.","PeriodicalId":142139,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Monopoly","volume":"47 23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Monopoly","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2807682","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This paper resolves the chainstore paradox by viewing each game of a monopolist against a single competitor as a sequential game. Every game is done under perfect and complete information. In this sequential game, with subgame perfection imposed, the number of sequential stages - even or odd - matter greatly for the resulting equilibrium, with odd supporting the deterrence theory equilibrium and even supporting the induction theory equilibrium.
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
分享
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
扫码关注我们
