Supplier Development and Integration in Competitive Supply Chains

ERN: Monopoly Pub Date : 2016-10-06 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.2848993
Yannan Jin, Q. Hu, Sang Won Kim, Sean X. Zhou
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引用次数: 39

Abstract

Supplier development and supplier integration are two deeply interconnected strategic tools that manufacturers often employ to improve the efficiency and competitiveness of their supply chains. This paper studies the interaction of these two strategic decisions in a competitive environment. Specifically, we analyze a duopoly model where manufacturers source two (different) components from their suppliers to produce and sell substitutable products in the market. Each manufacturer has a distinct collaborative supplier whom it decides whether to integrate with and how much to invest on to help reduce the supplier’s cost. We consider two sourcing structures: dedicated sourcing (sourcing both components only from its collaborative supplier) and diversified sourcing (sourcing one component from its collaborative supplier and the other from its competitor’s). We find that in most cases supplier integration leads to a larger investment on supplier development; and at equilibrium both manufacturers integrate with their collaborative suppliers. However, when the heterogeneity of the manufacturers’ supplier development capabilities is high, under the dedicated sourcing, supplier integration may result in a lower supplier development level from the less capable manufacturer who, at equilibrium, prefers not to integrate with its supplier. Furthermore, we find that in most cases, the manufacturers invest more on supplier development under the dedicated sourcing, while both manufacturers prefer the diversified sourcing to the dedicated one. The exception occurs when the heterogeneity of the manufacturers’ supplier development capabilities is high: the less capable manufacturer may invest more on supplier development under the diversified sourcing and the more capable manufacturer is better-off under the dedicated sourcing. Finally, by comparing with the monopoly case, we show that the market competition is one important driver to many of the preceding results.
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竞争供应链中的供应商发展与整合
供应商开发和供应商整合是两种紧密相连的战略工具,制造商经常使用它们来提高供应链的效率和竞争力。本文研究了这两种战略决策在竞争环境下的相互作用。具体来说,我们分析了一个双寡头模型,其中制造商从供应商那里采购两种(不同)组件,以在市场上生产和销售可替代的产品。每个制造商都有一个独特的协作供应商,制造商可以决定是否与供应商集成,以及投资多少来帮助降低供应商的成本。我们考虑了两种采购结构:专用采购(只从其合作供应商处采购两个组件)和多元化采购(从其合作供应商处采购一个组件,从其竞争对手处采购另一个组件)。我们发现,在大多数情况下,供应商整合导致企业在供应商开发上的投资增加;在平衡状态下,两个制造商与他们的合作供应商整合在一起。然而,当制造商的供应商开发能力异质性较高时,在专用采购下,供应商整合可能导致能力较差的制造商在平衡状态下不愿意与其供应商整合,从而降低供应商开发水平。此外,我们发现,在大多数情况下,制造商在专用采购下对供应商开发的投入更多,而两家制造商都更倾向于多元化采购而不是专用采购。当制造商的供应商开发能力异质性较高时,则会出现例外情况:在多元化采购下,能力较弱的制造商可能会在供应商开发上投入更多,而在专用采购下,能力较强的制造商则会获得更好的投资。最后,通过与垄断案例的比较,我们发现市场竞争是上述许多结果的一个重要驱动因素。
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