Revisiting the Hybrid Attack on Sparse Secret LWE and Application to HE Parameters

Yongha Son, J. Cheon
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引用次数: 16

Abstract

In the practical use of the Learning With Error (LWE) based cryptosystems, it is quite common to choose the secret to be extremely small: one popular choice is ternary ((±1,0),coefficient vector, and some further use ternary vector having only small numbers of nonzero coefficient, what is called \em sparse and ternary vector. This use of small secret also benefits to attack algorithms against LWE, and currently LWE-based cryptosystems including homomorphic encryptions (HE) set parameters based on the attack complexity of those improved attacks. In this work, we revisit the well-known Howgrave-Graham's hybrid attack, which was originally designed to solve the NTRU problem, with respect to sparse and ternary secret LWE case, and also refine the previous analysis for the hybrid attack in line with LWE setting. Moreover, upon our analysis we estimate attack complexity of the hybrid attack for several LWE parameters. As a result, we argue the currently used HE parameters should be raised to maintain the same security level by considering the hybrid attack; for example, the parameter set (n,log q,σ) = (65536, 1240, 3.2) with Hamming weight of secret key h = 64, which was estimated to satisfy ≥ 128$ bit-security by the previously considered attacks, is newly estimated to provide only 113 bit-security by the hybrid attack.
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再论稀疏秘密LWE混合攻击及其在HE参数中的应用
在基于误差学习(LWE)的密码系统的实际使用中,通常选择极小的秘密:一种流行的选择是三元(±1,0),系数向量,还有一些进一步使用只有少量非零系数的三元向量,称为\em稀疏和三元向量。这种小秘密的使用也有利于针对LWE的攻击算法,目前基于LWE的密码系统(包括同态加密(HE))根据这些改进攻击的攻击复杂性设置参数。在这项工作中,我们重新审视了著名的Howgrave-Graham混合攻击,该混合攻击最初是为了解决NTRU问题而设计的,针对稀疏和三元秘密LWE情况,并根据LWE设置对先前的混合攻击分析进行了改进。此外,在分析的基础上,我们估计了几种LWE参数下混合攻击的攻击复杂度。因此,我们认为应考虑混合攻击,提高当前使用的HE参数,以保持相同的安全级别;例如,参数集(n,log q,σ) =(65536,1240,3.2),秘钥的Hamming权值h = 64,先前考虑的攻击估计该参数集满足≥128$ bit的安全性,而新的混合攻击估计该参数集仅提供113 $ bit的安全性。
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