CAN FUNCTIONAL AND PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS BE DIVIDED

J. Taylor
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

We answer the question raised by the title by developing a neural architecture for the attention control system in animals in a hierarchical manner, following what we conjecture is an evolutionary path. The resulting evolutionary model (based on CODAM at the highest level) and answer to the question allow us to consider both different forms of consciousness as well as how machine consciousness could itself possess a variety of forms.
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功能意识和现象意识可以分开吗
我们回答了题目所提出的问题,即按照我们推测的进化路径,以分层方式为动物的注意力控制系统开发一种神经结构。由此产生的进化模型(基于最高级别的CODAM)和问题的答案使我们能够考虑意识的不同形式,以及机器意识本身如何拥有各种形式。
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