Pub Date : 2014-09-01DOI: 10.1142/S1793843014400149
T. Kelley
As part of the development of the Symbolic and Sub-symbolic Robotics Intelligence Control System (SS-RICS), we have implemented a memory store to allow a robot to retain knowledge from previous experiences. As part of the development of the event memory store justification for an off-line, unconscious, cueing process was tested. Three strategies for the recognition of previous events were compared. The first strategy stored all memories and searched all of the memories for a match to the current event. The second strategy searched memories while an event was taking place and started the search with the most recent memory first. Finally, a third strategy post-processed all memories using pruning, abstraction, and cueing. Pruning removed memories, abstraction used categories to reduce metric information, and the cueing process provided pointers for the subsequent recognition of episodes. We found that post-processing memories as an unconscious process was the most efficient strategy. This computational implementation provides a justification for the post-processing of memories as an efficient means of memory retrieval.
{"title":"Robotic Dreams: A Computational Justification for the Post-Hoc Processing of Episodic Memories","authors":"T. Kelley","doi":"10.1142/S1793843014400149","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793843014400149","url":null,"abstract":"As part of the development of the Symbolic and Sub-symbolic Robotics Intelligence Control System (SS-RICS), we have implemented a memory store to allow a robot to retain knowledge from previous experiences. As part of the development of the event memory store justification for an off-line, unconscious, cueing process was tested. Three strategies for the recognition of previous events were compared. The first strategy stored all memories and searched all of the memories for a match to the current event. The second strategy searched memories while an event was taking place and started the search with the most recent memory first. Finally, a third strategy post-processed all memories using pruning, abstraction, and cueing. Pruning removed memories, abstraction used categories to reduce metric information, and the cueing process provided pointers for the subsequent recognition of episodes. We found that post-processing memories as an unconscious process was the most efficient strategy. This computational implementation provides a justification for the post-processing of memories as an efficient means of memory retrieval.","PeriodicalId":418022,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Machine Consciousness","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121689999","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2014-09-01DOI: 10.1142/S1793843014400162
Joel Parthemore, Blay Whitby
This paper follows directly from an earlier paper where we discussed the requirements for an artifact to be a moral agent and concluded that the artifactual question is ultimately a red herring. As before, we take moral agency to be that condition in which an agent can appropriately be held responsible for her actions and their consequences. We set a number of stringent conditions on moral agency. A moral agent must be embedded in a cultural and specifically moral context and embodied in a suitable physical form. It must be, in some substantive sense, alive. It must exhibit self-conscious awareness. It must exhibit sophisticated conceptual abilities, going well beyond what the likely majority of conceptual agents possess: not least that it must possess a well-developed moral space of reasons. Finally, it must be able to communicate its moral agency through some system of signs: A "private" moral world is not enough. After reviewing these conditions and pouring cold water on recent claims for having achieved "minimal" machine consciousness, we turn our attention to a number of existing and, in some cases, commonplace artifacts that lack moral agency yet nevertheless require one to take a moral stance toward them, as if they were moral agents. Finally, we address another class of agents raising a related set of issues: autonomous military robots.
{"title":"Moral Agency, Moral Responsibility, and Artifacts : What Existing Artifacts Fail to Achieve (and Why), and Why They, Nevertheless, Can (and Do!) Make Moral Claims Upon Us","authors":"Joel Parthemore, Blay Whitby","doi":"10.1142/S1793843014400162","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793843014400162","url":null,"abstract":"This paper follows directly from an earlier paper where we discussed the requirements for an artifact to be a moral agent and concluded that the artifactual question is ultimately a red herring. As before, we take moral agency to be that condition in which an agent can appropriately be held responsible for her actions and their consequences. We set a number of stringent conditions on moral agency. A moral agent must be embedded in a cultural and specifically moral context and embodied in a suitable physical form. It must be, in some substantive sense, alive. It must exhibit self-conscious awareness. It must exhibit sophisticated conceptual abilities, going well beyond what the likely majority of conceptual agents possess: not least that it must possess a well-developed moral space of reasons. Finally, it must be able to communicate its moral agency through some system of signs: A \"private\" moral world is not enough. After reviewing these conditions and pouring cold water on recent claims for having achieved \"minimal\" machine consciousness, we turn our attention to a number of existing and, in some cases, commonplace artifacts that lack moral agency yet nevertheless require one to take a moral stance toward them, as if they were moral agents. Finally, we address another class of agents raising a related set of issues: autonomous military robots.","PeriodicalId":418022,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Machine Consciousness","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128822582","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2014-09-01DOI: 10.1142/S1793843014400137
S. Thaler
By allowing one artificial neural network to govern the synaptic noise injected into another based upon its appraisal of patterns nucleating from such disturbances, a contemplative form of artificial intelligence is formed whose creativity and pattern delivery closely parallels that of human cognition. Drawing upon the theory of fractional Brownian motion, we may derive an equation, verifiable through statistical mechanics, which governs both the novelty and rhythm of pattern turnover within such neural systems. Through this equation, we gain valuable insight into the process of idea formation within the brain, whether that organ is making sense of its environment or itself. In doing so, a relationship between creativity and consciousness is revealed, along with a potential path toward building conscious machine intelligence.
{"title":"Synaptic Perturbation and Consciousness","authors":"S. Thaler","doi":"10.1142/S1793843014400137","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793843014400137","url":null,"abstract":"By allowing one artificial neural network to govern the synaptic noise injected into another based upon its appraisal of patterns nucleating from such disturbances, a contemplative form of artificial intelligence is formed whose creativity and pattern delivery closely parallels that of human cognition. Drawing upon the theory of fractional Brownian motion, we may derive an equation, verifiable through statistical mechanics, which governs both the novelty and rhythm of pattern turnover within such neural systems. Through this equation, we gain valuable insight into the process of idea formation within the brain, whether that organ is making sense of its environment or itself. In doing so, a relationship between creativity and consciousness is revealed, along with a potential path toward building conscious machine intelligence.","PeriodicalId":418022,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Machine Consciousness","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114806123","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2014-09-01DOI: 10.1142/S1793843014400150
P. Gelepithis
I propose a physicalist theory of consciousness that is an extension of the theory of noemona species. The proposed theory covers the full consciousness spectrum from animal to machine and its human consciousness base is compatible with the corresponding work of Wundt, James, and Freud. The paper is organized in three sections. In the first, I briefly justify the methodology used. In Sec. 2, I state the inadequacies of the major work on the nature of consciousness and present a definitional system that adequately describes its changing nature and scope. Finally in Sec. 3, I state some of the consequences of the theory and introduce some of its future extensions.
{"title":"A Novel Theory of Consciousness","authors":"P. Gelepithis","doi":"10.1142/S1793843014400150","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793843014400150","url":null,"abstract":"I propose a physicalist theory of consciousness that is an extension of the theory of noemona species. The proposed theory covers the full consciousness spectrum from animal to machine and its human consciousness base is compatible with the corresponding work of Wundt, James, and Freud. The paper is organized in three sections. In the first, I briefly justify the methodology used. In Sec. 2, I state the inadequacies of the major work on the nature of consciousness and present a definitional system that adequately describes its changing nature and scope. Finally in Sec. 3, I state some of the consequences of the theory and introduce some of its future extensions.","PeriodicalId":418022,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Machine Consciousness","volume":"06 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130672784","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2014-09-01DOI: 10.1142/S1793843014400174
M. Graziano, Taylor W. Webb
Recently we proposed a theory of consciousness, the attention schema theory, based on findings in cognitive psychology and systems neuroscience. In that theory, consciousness is an internal model of attention or an "attention schema". Consciousness relates to attention in the same way that the internal model of the body, the "body schema", relates to the physical body. The body schema is used to model and help control the body. The attention schema is used to model and help regulate attention, a data-handling process in the brain in which some signals are enhanced at the expense of other signals. We proposed that attention and the attention schema co-evolved over the past half-billion years. Over that time span, the attention schema may have taken on additional functions such as promoting the integration of information across diverse domains and promoting social cognition. This paper summarizes some of the main points of the attention schema theory, suggests how a brain with an attention schema might conc...
{"title":"A Mechanistic Theory of Consciousness","authors":"M. Graziano, Taylor W. Webb","doi":"10.1142/S1793843014400174","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793843014400174","url":null,"abstract":"Recently we proposed a theory of consciousness, the attention schema theory, based on findings in cognitive psychology and systems neuroscience. In that theory, consciousness is an internal model of attention or an \"attention schema\". Consciousness relates to attention in the same way that the internal model of the body, the \"body schema\", relates to the physical body. The body schema is used to model and help control the body. The attention schema is used to model and help regulate attention, a data-handling process in the brain in which some signals are enhanced at the expense of other signals. We proposed that attention and the attention schema co-evolved over the past half-billion years. Over that time span, the attention schema may have taken on additional functions such as promoting the integration of information across diverse domains and promoting social cognition. This paper summarizes some of the main points of the attention schema theory, suggests how a brain with an attention schema might conc...","PeriodicalId":418022,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Machine Consciousness","volume":"115 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132483820","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2014-05-01DOI: 10.1142/S1793843014400022
P. Boltuc
In his recent book, Consciousness and Robot Sentience (World Scienti c, 2012) Pentti Haikonen promises to tackle the real problem of consciousness" (p. vii); a task worth applauding. He de nes this problem as the search for a phenomenon, process or a system property that causes some neural activity to appear internally as subjective experience" (pp. 13, 14). According to Haikonen the problem consists of three issues:
{"title":"Haikonen's Philosophy of Machine Consciousness","authors":"P. Boltuc","doi":"10.1142/S1793843014400022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793843014400022","url":null,"abstract":"In his recent book, Consciousness and Robot Sentience (World Scienti c, 2012) Pentti Haikonen promises to tackle the real problem of consciousness\" (p. vii); a task worth applauding. He de nes this problem as the search for a phenomenon, process or a system property that causes some neural activity to appear internally as subjective experience\" (pp. 13, 14). According to Haikonen the problem consists of three issues:","PeriodicalId":418022,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Machine Consciousness","volume":"108 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124930198","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2014-05-01DOI: 10.1142/S1793843014400071
D. McDermott
This book is both a history of attempts to understand consciousness, and a presentation of the authors' own theory. The history is well written and informative. The theory has some intriguing aspects, based on how a neurally controlled agent might locate itself in space. But for the most part they base their theory of consciousness on Giulio Tononi's proposal that sensations are trajectories of a neural system through a very high-dimensional state space. Because it is never explained how such a state space could influence verbal reports of the qualia of sensations, the theory leaves consciousness as a sort of vapor misting around the brain while waiting for a precise specification of its causal role.
{"title":"Review of Aristotle's Laptop: The Discovery of Our Informational Mind by Igor Aleksander and Helen Morton","authors":"D. McDermott","doi":"10.1142/S1793843014400071","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793843014400071","url":null,"abstract":"This book is both a history of attempts to understand consciousness, and a presentation of the authors' own theory. The history is well written and informative. The theory has some intriguing aspects, based on how a neurally controlled agent might locate itself in space. But for the most part they base their theory of consciousness on Giulio Tononi's proposal that sensations are trajectories of a neural system through a very high-dimensional state space. Because it is never explained how such a state space could influence verbal reports of the qualia of sensations, the theory leaves consciousness as a sort of vapor misting around the brain while waiting for a precise specification of its causal role.","PeriodicalId":418022,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Machine Consciousness","volume":"36 10","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120910088","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2014-05-01DOI: 10.1142/S1793843014400101
M. Shanahan
{"title":"Review of \"Consciousness and Robot Sentience\" by Pentti Haikonen","authors":"M. Shanahan","doi":"10.1142/S1793843014400101","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793843014400101","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":418022,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Machine Consciousness","volume":"207 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122876995","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2014-05-01DOI: 10.1142/S1793843014400083
A. Samsonovich
{"title":"The Informational Reality Commentary on Igor Aleksander and Helen Morton's — \"Aristotle's Laptop: The Discovery of Our Informational Mind\"","authors":"A. Samsonovich","doi":"10.1142/S1793843014400083","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793843014400083","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":418022,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Machine Consciousness","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128479054","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2014-05-01DOI: 10.1142/S1793843014400058
E. Hudlicka
Given the recent heated debates and controversies regarding machine consciousness, it would seem that writing a book on robot consciousness is a daring act. Expressing almost any view on this controversial, many might say intractable, topic opens the author to a range of criticisms. Addressing machine consciousness seems to present an unpalatable choice. One can take a high road", and address the ontological status of consciousness, present arguments for or against various types of consciousness, and whether or not one or the other can be su±ciently operationalized to enable an implementation. These treatments often illustrate their perspective with a limited implemented model, and thereby open themselves to criticisms of insu±cient detail, overly-aggregated and unexplainable constructs, and limited or no implementation. Alternatively, one can take a low road", focus on a single aspect of consciousness, and provide a (necessarily) limited implementation, and invite criticism of too narrow a focus, non-generalizable implementation, and a lack of validation. It is not easy to win in the game of machine consciousness. (Could this, perhaps, indicate that it may be the wrong game to play at this time, with the available neuroscience data and computational modeling methodologies?) Haikonen's book strikes a reasonable middle ground between these two extremes, and positions itself closer to the second of the two alternatives above: the more fruitful of the two, in my opinion. In the rst half of the book, Haikonen adopts a strong stance regarding the nature of, or at least an essential precondition for, consciousness: qualia based perception [ ] the presence of the phenomenal subjective experience; and internal appearance of the perception-related neural activity" (p. 53) and associated connection to sub-symbolic processing. In fact, he goes much further than this, and claims that: the one and only real mystery of consciousness is the existence of the inner appearance of the neural activity in the brain" (p. 225). He then elaborates this view by discussing the nature of, and evidence for, a variety of qualia, including amodal qualia, in biological agents, and describes the machine International Journal of Machine Consciousness Vol. 6, No. 1 (2014) 29–39 #.c World Scienti c Publishing Company DOI: 10.1142/S1793843014400058
{"title":"Book Review: Consciousness and Robot Sentience by Pentti Olavi Antero Haikonen","authors":"E. Hudlicka","doi":"10.1142/S1793843014400058","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793843014400058","url":null,"abstract":"Given the recent heated debates and controversies regarding machine consciousness, it would seem that writing a book on robot consciousness is a daring act. Expressing almost any view on this controversial, many might say intractable, topic opens the author to a range of criticisms. Addressing machine consciousness seems to present an unpalatable choice. One can take a high road\", and address the ontological status of consciousness, present arguments for or against various types of consciousness, and whether or not one or the other can be su±ciently operationalized to enable an implementation. These treatments often illustrate their perspective with a limited implemented model, and thereby open themselves to criticisms of insu±cient detail, overly-aggregated and unexplainable constructs, and limited or no implementation. Alternatively, one can take a low road\", focus on a single aspect of consciousness, and provide a (necessarily) limited implementation, and invite criticism of too narrow a focus, non-generalizable implementation, and a lack of validation. It is not easy to win in the game of machine consciousness. (Could this, perhaps, indicate that it may be the wrong game to play at this time, with the available neuroscience data and computational modeling methodologies?) Haikonen's book strikes a reasonable middle ground between these two extremes, and positions itself closer to the second of the two alternatives above: the more fruitful of the two, in my opinion. In the rst half of the book, Haikonen adopts a strong stance regarding the nature of, or at least an essential precondition for, consciousness: qualia based perception [ ] the presence of the phenomenal subjective experience; and internal appearance of the perception-related neural activity\" (p. 53) and associated connection to sub-symbolic processing. In fact, he goes much further than this, and claims that: the one and only real mystery of consciousness is the existence of the inner appearance of the neural activity in the brain\" (p. 225). He then elaborates this view by discussing the nature of, and evidence for, a variety of qualia, including amodal qualia, in biological agents, and describes the machine International Journal of Machine Consciousness Vol. 6, No. 1 (2014) 29–39 #.c World Scienti c Publishing Company DOI: 10.1142/S1793843014400058","PeriodicalId":418022,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Machine Consciousness","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125839839","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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