Contemporary Cognitive Psychology: What Theories Do

V. Spiridonov, N. Loginov
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Abstract

This paper continues the analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of ontic structural realism, which begun in the first part of the paper. Non-eliminative versions of this approach are considered, which try to find a compromise between the ontology of structures and the ontology of objects. It is shown that the semirealism of A. Chakravartti and the constructive structural realism of T. Cao have a number of limitations caused by the authors’ desire to strictly distinguish between the nature of the existence of objects and structures. Then the version of the relationship between structures and entities is presented. Firstly, two concepts are divided according to their content: “object” and “entity”. Second, to solve the problem of causality, I suggest that the nature of entities and structures lie in their ability to act. It is this ability that I propose to use instead of the popular concepts of “causal powers”, “causal properties” or “dispositions”. Third, instead of a rigid alternative to ontological primitives – either essence, or causal relations, or structures – the concept of ontological pluralism and inherited existence is proposed. There each entity is represented as a derivative of another structure and, in turn, creates other entities and structures. Thus, both structures and entities at each level of the complexity hierarchy partially inherit the ability to act and a certain degree of existence from the structures and entities of the previous levels. Finally, I am trying to clarify the modal aspects of the ontic structural realism. Following the popular interpretations of quantum theory, the ability to act, and hence the existence of structures and entities, are considered separately in two worlds – potential and actual ones. The potential world is associated with a set of possible objects and structures of quantum theory, and the actual world is associated with a set of real (observable) objects and structures of classical physical theories. The transition from the potential to the actual world is proposed to be considered as a primitive metaphysical event. The proposed concept partially overcomes the objections to ontic structural realism, thereby strengthening its position in the discussion about the reality of quantum objects.
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当代认知心理学:理论在做什么
本文继续分析了第一部分开始的本体结构现实主义的利弊。这种方法的非消除版本被考虑,它试图在结构本体和对象本体之间找到一个妥协。结果表明,查克拉瓦蒂的半现实主义和曹操的建构性结构现实主义都存在一定的局限性,这是由于作者希望严格区分客体和结构存在的本质。然后给出了结构与实体之间关系的版本。首先,根据其内容划分两个概念:“对象”和“实体”。其次,为了解决因果关系问题,我认为实体和结构的本质在于它们的行动能力。我建议用这种能力来代替流行的“因果能力”、“因果属性”或“性格”等概念。第三,本文提出了本体论多元论和继承存在的概念,而不是对本体论原语(本质、因果关系或结构)的严格替代。在这里,每个实体都被表示为另一个结构的衍生物,并反过来创建其他实体和结构。因此,复杂性层次的每一层的结构和实体都部分继承了前一层的结构和实体的行动能力和一定程度的存在性。最后,我试图澄清本体结构现实主义的模态方面。按照量子理论的流行解释,行动的能力,以及结构和实体的存在,被分开考虑在两个世界中——潜在的和现实的。在量子理论中,潜在世界与一组可能的物体和结构有关,而在经典物理理论中,现实世界与一组真实的(可观察的)物体和结构有关。从潜在世界到现实世界的过渡被认为是一个原始的形而上学事件。所提出的概念部分地克服了对本体结构实在论的反对意见,从而加强了其在关于量子物体实在性的讨论中的地位。
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