Popper’s popular critics – Kuhn, Feyerabend, and Lakatos – replace his older, Wittgenstein-style critics, now defunct. His new critics played with the idea of criticism as beneficial, in vain search of variants of these that could better appeal to the public. Some of their criticism of Popper is valid but marginal for the dispute about rationality. He was Fallibilist; they hedged about it. He viewed learning from experience as learning from error; they were unclear about it. His view resembles Freud’s reality principle; they hedged about this too, as they defended the stupid idea of constructive criticism (namely, hold on to your faith in a refuted theory until you can replace it). He stressed his criticism of the view of science as inductive; they endorsed it. They differed from him significantly regarding their intended readers: he had addressed those who readily admit criticism and his popular critics addressed those who find it hard to admit openly that criticism upsets them somewhat. Current popular criticism of Popper’s ideas shows yet again the logical relation between the critical attitude and liberalism: liberalism without critically mindedness is permissible, scarcely the other way around. Hence, we better read the objection that Popper’s popular critics have launched against him not as criticism proper, but as somewhat reasonable protest against his use of the highest standards in his relentless advocacy of liberalism and of criticism in his valuation of science and of democracy as joint.
{"title":"Popper and His Popular Critics: Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend and Imre Lakatos: Appendix","authors":"J. Agassi","doi":"10.5840/eps202259465","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202259465","url":null,"abstract":"Popper’s popular critics – Kuhn, Feyerabend, and Lakatos – replace his older, Wittgenstein-style critics, now defunct. His new critics played with the idea of criticism as beneficial, in vain search of variants of these that could better appeal to the public. Some of their criticism of Popper is valid but marginal for the dispute about rationality. He was Fallibilist; they hedged about it. He viewed learning from experience as learning from error; they were unclear about it. His view resembles Freud’s reality principle; they hedged about this too, as they defended the stupid idea of constructive criticism (namely, hold on to your faith in a refuted theory until you can replace it). He stressed his criticism of the view of science as inductive; they endorsed it. They differed from him significantly regarding their intended readers: he had addressed those who readily admit criticism and his popular critics addressed those who find it hard to admit openly that criticism upsets them somewhat. Current popular criticism of Popper’s ideas shows yet again the logical relation between the critical attitude and liberalism: liberalism without critically mindedness is permissible, scarcely the other way around. Hence, we better read the objection that Popper’s popular critics have launched against him not as criticism proper, but as somewhat reasonable protest against his use of the highest standards in his relentless advocacy of liberalism and of criticism in his valuation of science and of democracy as joint.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124954113","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article critically examines the project of the Hong Kong philosopher Yuk Hui to create organological and cosmotechnical epistemology. To open up the prospect of a “new epistemology” of this kind, Hui carries out a historical and rational reconstruction of the 250-year movement of European thought – from German idealism to second-order cybernetics. In all these theories and approaches, he reveals the key role of the recursive-contingent ligament. But what has happened in recent decades that prompted the author to reassemble Wiener’s non-trivial cybernetic machines and propose a cosmotechnical strategy for moving towards a “new epistemology”? How justified is it that, in constructing his axiocosmotechnics, he turns to the philosophy of the East, ancient and modern? The author of the article attempts to provide answers to these and other questions.
{"title":"Towards a “New Epistemology”: Yuk Hui’s Recursivity and Contingency","authors":"Evgeniy N. Ivakhnenko","doi":"10.5840/eps202259351","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202259351","url":null,"abstract":"The article critically examines the project of the Hong Kong philosopher Yuk Hui to create organological and cosmotechnical epistemology. To open up the prospect of a “new epistemology” of this kind, Hui carries out a historical and rational reconstruction of the 250-year movement of European thought – from German idealism to second-order cybernetics. In all these theories and approaches, he reveals the key role of the recursive-contingent ligament. But what has happened in recent decades that prompted the author to reassemble Wiener’s non-trivial cybernetic machines and propose a cosmotechnical strategy for moving towards a “new epistemology”? How justified is it that, in constructing his axiocosmotechnics, he turns to the philosophy of the East, ancient and modern? The author of the article attempts to provide answers to these and other questions.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"165 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127300040","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper comments on Emar Maier’s “Unreliability and point of view in filmic narration”. It is suggested that, without having discourse representations that include embedding operators, films can be unreliable in the broad sense of having propositional contents that depart from inferable, realistic scenarios. Second, films and embedded shots in film can convey agent-centered information without being composed of point-of-view shots. The reason is that the discourse representation can include information about discourse referents that identifies a depicted individual as a counterpart of the experiencer.
{"title":"A Possible-Worlds Construal of Unreliability in Film","authors":"D. Abusch","doi":"10.5840/eps202259218","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202259218","url":null,"abstract":"This paper comments on Emar Maier’s “Unreliability and point of view in filmic narration”. It is suggested that, without having discourse representations that include embedding operators, films can be unreliable in the broad sense of having propositional contents that depart from inferable, realistic scenarios. Second, films and embedded shots in film can convey agent-centered information without being composed of point-of-view shots. The reason is that the discourse representation can include information about discourse referents that identifies a depicted individual as a counterpart of the experiencer.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"63 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127441495","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The aim of this article is to present a variant of epistemic relativism that is compatible with a language practice especially popular among scientists. We argue that in science, but also in philosophy, propositions are naturally ‘relativized’ to sets of hypotheses or theories, and that a similar language practice allows one to interpret canonical problems of epistemology. We apply the model to Gettier’s problem, and derive a condition under which counterexamples à la Gettier to Plato’s account of knowledge do not arise. We argue that these findings give further content to a well-known result by Zagzebski (1994). Our interpretation points to a type of epistemic relativism having links with contextualism in epistemology, and perspectivism in philosophy of science.
{"title":"Epistemic Relativism and the Gettier Problem","authors":"L. Vervoort, A. Shevchenko","doi":"10.5840/eps20225917","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps20225917","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this article is to present a variant of epistemic relativism that is compatible with a language practice especially popular among scientists. We argue that in science, but also in philosophy, propositions are naturally ‘relativized’ to sets of hypotheses or theories, and that a similar language practice allows one to interpret canonical problems of epistemology. We apply the model to Gettier’s problem, and derive a condition under which counterexamples à la Gettier to Plato’s account of knowledge do not arise. We argue that these findings give further content to a well-known result by Zagzebski (1994). Our interpretation points to a type of epistemic relativism having links with contextualism in epistemology, and perspectivism in philosophy of science.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115184556","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article is a reply to Ilya T. Kasavin’s “Creativity as a social phenomenon” and is devoted to the phenomenon of the scientific precariat. A systematic analysis of the relations between the scientific precariat and the academic community as a dialectical opposition of the individual and the collective is undertaken. The method of critical analysis is aimed at rethinking the stable ideas that have developed in science about the collectivity of scientific work. The concepts of labor and employment in science are considered. It is concluded that the global development of digital technologies has led to the disappearance of the boundaries between physical and intellectual labor, against which there is an elevation of creative activity. The availability of information on the Internet, opening up incredible opportunities for research, destroys the monopoly of professional scientific communities on the possession of scientific knowledge. Scientific precarious loudly declare themselves in the public space, demonstrating the boldness and unusual nature of the ideas expressed. Inspired seekers of scientific truth embark on a free voyage through the vastness of the unknown. Traditional scientific communications, while retaining their significance, are enriched with new, non-standard ideas of precarious scientists who, ignoring rules and hierarchies, bring the creative spirit of freedom into modern science. However, the activities of such scientists may have an ambiguous assessment: a precarious scientist completely loses touch with the existing methods and approaches of classical science, and flight from work standards instead of expanding the horizons of scientific creativity turns into new problems caused by “multi-task” and instability of the labor activity of a “free” scientist. Despite the fact that in the conditions of the development of modern society and technology, the opposition of the pair of individual and collective is leveled, many scientists need common structures that determine the development of science, which at the present stage of the development of scientific knowledge are rather represented not by a social organization, but by an intellectual, linguistic and methodological unity focused on the creative development of the world.
这篇文章是对Ilya T. Kasavin的“创造力作为一种社会现象”的回应，致力于科学无产者的现象。作为个体与集体的辩证对立，对科学无产者与学术共同体之间的关系进行了系统的分析。批判分析的方法旨在重新思考科学中发展起来的关于科学工作集体性的稳定观念。考虑了科学中劳动和就业的概念。结论是，数字技术的全球发展导致体力劳动和智力劳动之间的界限消失，而创造性活动却在此基础上得到提升。互联网上信息的可获得性为研究提供了难以置信的机会，打破了专业科学界对科学知识的垄断。科学危险在公共空间大声宣告自己，展示了所表达思想的大胆和不同寻常的性质。科学真理的探索者在浩瀚的未知世界中展开了一次自由的航行。传统的科学传播在保留其意义的同时，也被不稳定的科学家们提出的新的、非标准的思想所丰富，他们无视规则和等级制度，将自由的创造精神带入现代科学。然而，这类科学家的活动可能有一种模棱两可的评价:一个不稳定的科学家完全失去了与经典科学现有的方法和途径的联系，对工作标准的逃避而不是扩大科学创造力的视野，变成了一个“自由”科学家的劳动活动的“多任务”和不稳定所造成的新问题。尽管在现代社会和技术发展的条件下，个人和集体的对立是平等的，但许多科学家需要共同的结构来决定科学的发展，在科学知识发展的现阶段，这种结构不是由一个社会组织来代表的，而是由一个专注于世界创造性发展的智力、语言和方法论的统一来代表的。
{"title":"Scientific Precariat: Individualism versus Collectivism","authors":"Nadezhda D. Astashova","doi":"10.5840/eps202259337","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202259337","url":null,"abstract":"The article is a reply to Ilya T. Kasavin’s “Creativity as a social phenomenon” and is devoted to the phenomenon of the scientific precariat. A systematic analysis of the relations between the scientific precariat and the academic community as a dialectical opposition of the individual and the collective is undertaken. The method of critical analysis is aimed at rethinking the stable ideas that have developed in science about the collectivity of scientific work. The concepts of labor and employment in science are considered. It is concluded that the global development of digital technologies has led to the disappearance of the boundaries between physical and intellectual labor, against which there is an elevation of creative activity. The availability of information on the Internet, opening up incredible opportunities for research, destroys the monopoly of professional scientific communities on the possession of scientific knowledge. Scientific precarious loudly declare themselves in the public space, demonstrating the boldness and unusual nature of the ideas expressed. Inspired seekers of scientific truth embark on a free voyage through the vastness of the unknown. Traditional scientific communications, while retaining their significance, are enriched with new, non-standard ideas of precarious scientists who, ignoring rules and hierarchies, bring the creative spirit of freedom into modern science. However, the activities of such scientists may have an ambiguous assessment: a precarious scientist completely loses touch with the existing methods and approaches of classical science, and flight from work standards instead of expanding the horizons of scientific creativity turns into new problems caused by “multi-task” and instability of the labor activity of a “free” scientist. Despite the fact that in the conditions of the development of modern society and technology, the opposition of the pair of individual and collective is leveled, many scientists need common structures that determine the development of science, which at the present stage of the development of scientific knowledge are rather represented not by a social organization, but by an intellectual, linguistic and methodological unity focused on the creative development of the world.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123037708","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper discusses knowledge of opposites. In particular, attention is given to the linguistic notion of antonymy and how it represents oppositional relations that are commonly found in perception. The paper draws upon the long history of work on the formalisation of antonymy in linguistics and formal semantics, and also upon work on the perception of opposites in psychology, and an assessment is made of the main approaches. Treatments of these phenomena in linguistics and psychology posit that the principles of minimal difference and invariance are centrally important. It will be suggested that the standard approach employing meaning postulates fails to capture the relevant notion of antonymy, in part because it is not informed by these principles, and in part due to a number of other problems with this kind of approach, many of which may be overcome by building in the central principles from the beginning. The paper also discusses the issue of whether we can know that opposites necessarily exclude each other and, if so, how. This issue is intertwined with what is known as the colour incompatibility problem that Wittgenstein wrangled with at various times during his life. The paper assesses various solutions to these problems including an approach that was first put forward by Jerrold J. Katz. The relation between this approach and the theory of determinables and determinates is also examined. A further development upon this approach is proposed and then applied to the case of the formalisation of antonymy. It is argued that this approach avoids the problems suffered by the main approaches discussed earlier in the paper.
本文主要讨论对立物知识。特别要注意的是反义词的语言学概念，以及它是如何代表在感知中常见的对立关系的。本文借鉴了语言学和形式语义学中反义词形式化的悠久历史，以及心理学中对立感知的工作，并对主要方法进行了评估。语言学和心理学对这些现象的研究认为，最小差异和不变性的原则是最重要的。使用意义假设的标准方法未能捕捉到反义词的相关概念，部分原因是它没有得到这些原则的信息，部分原因是这种方法存在许多其他问题，其中许多问题可以通过从一开始就建立中心原则来克服。本文还讨论了我们是否可以知道对立面必然相互排斥的问题，如果可以，如何知道。这个问题与维特根斯坦一生中多次争论的颜色不相容问题交织在一起。本文评估了这些问题的各种解决方案，包括Jerrold J. Katz首先提出的一种方法。本文还探讨了这种方法与可决定物和决定物理论之间的关系。在此基础上提出了进一步的发展，然后应用于反义词形式化的情况。本文认为，这种方法避免了本文前面讨论的主要方法所遇到的问题。
{"title":"Knowing Opposites and Formalising Antonymy","authors":"Keith Begley","doi":"10.5840/eps202259226","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202259226","url":null,"abstract":"This paper discusses knowledge of opposites. In particular, attention is given to the linguistic notion of antonymy and how it represents oppositional relations that are commonly found in perception. The paper draws upon the long history of work on the formalisation of antonymy in linguistics and formal semantics, and also upon work on the perception of opposites in psychology, and an assessment is made of the main approaches. Treatments of these phenomena in linguistics and psychology posit that the principles of minimal difference and invariance are centrally important. It will be suggested that the standard approach employing meaning postulates fails to capture the relevant notion of antonymy, in part because it is not informed by these principles, and in part due to a number of other problems with this kind of approach, many of which may be overcome by building in the central principles from the beginning. The paper also discusses the issue of whether we can know that opposites necessarily exclude each other and, if so, how. This issue is intertwined with what is known as the colour incompatibility problem that Wittgenstein wrangled with at various times during his life. The paper assesses various solutions to these problems including an approach that was first put forward by Jerrold J. Katz. The relation between this approach and the theory of determinables and determinates is also examined. A further development upon this approach is proposed and then applied to the case of the formalisation of antonymy. It is argued that this approach avoids the problems suffered by the main approaches discussed earlier in the paper.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122108102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Understanding has usually been seen as a method of hermeneutics. Until recently, philosophers of science paid little attention to the topic of scientific understanding because they came to the conclusion that understanding can be nothing more than a psychological by-product of scientific activity. However, many scientists believed that understanding was an important aim of science. The article states that understanding is a universal cognitive phenomenon applicable to the knowledge of not only cultural and historical phenomena, but also natural objects and processes. Understanding does not oppose explanation; some types of the latter produce scientific understanding. In the course of criticism of the standard model of scientific explanation, the first concepts of “scientific understanding” arose – unifying and causal-mechanistic. A pragmatic approach to scientific understanding is also considered, linking it to the cognitive skills of a scientist or a group of scientists.
{"title":"From Explanation to Understanding","authors":"V. Filatov","doi":"10.5840/eps202360218","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202360218","url":null,"abstract":"Understanding has usually been seen as a method of hermeneutics. Until recently, philosophers of science paid little attention to the topic of scientific understanding because they came to the conclusion that understanding can be nothing more than a psychological by-product of scientific activity. However, many scientists believed that understanding was an important aim of science. The article states that understanding is a universal cognitive phenomenon applicable to the knowledge of not only cultural and historical phenomena, but also natural objects and processes. Understanding does not oppose explanation; some types of the latter produce scientific understanding. In the course of criticism of the standard model of scientific explanation, the first concepts of “scientific understanding” arose – unifying and causal-mechanistic. A pragmatic approach to scientific understanding is also considered, linking it to the cognitive skills of a scientist or a group of scientists.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"75 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128727857","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this reply to the article by A.M. Dorozhkin and S.V. Shibarshina, the question of the creative nature of the randomization technique is considered, which is understood as a rejection of logically obvious ways to solve scientific problems, and involves the inclusion of an element of randomness, or uncertainty, in the scientific search procedure. Some doubt is expressed about the consequences of introducing the technique of epistemological randomization into the tactics of solving scientific problems. The author of the article emphasizes the fact that an attempt to solve scientific problems by an inclusion of other, non-scientific elements in the area of science may be a case of randomization. The author determines the areas which are subject to an uncertainty factor. Art and culture are regarded as such non-science areas. However, the appeal to uncertainty is an indication of a fundamental inability to describe in quantitative terms the origin of creativity. This position can be characterized as “misterianism” in the interpretation of creativity, by analogy with misterianism in the understanding of consciousness by K. McGinn. In this case, the randomization technique is nothing more than one of the possible conditions for creativity, which cannot guarantee the appearance of an original result.
{"title":"Creativity Opportunities: When Non-science Helps o Answer Scientific Questions","authors":"O. Sokolova","doi":"10.5840/eps20236016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps20236016","url":null,"abstract":"In this reply to the article by A.M. Dorozhkin and S.V. Shibarshina, the question of the creative nature of the randomization technique is considered, which is understood as a rejection of logically obvious ways to solve scientific problems, and involves the inclusion of an element of randomness, or uncertainty, in the scientific search procedure. Some doubt is expressed about the consequences of introducing the technique of epistemological randomization into the tactics of solving scientific problems. The author of the article emphasizes the fact that an attempt to solve scientific problems by an inclusion of other, non-scientific elements in the area of science may be a case of randomization. The author determines the areas which are subject to an uncertainty factor. Art and culture are regarded as such non-science areas. However, the appeal to uncertainty is an indication of a fundamental inability to describe in quantitative terms the origin of creativity. This position can be characterized as “misterianism” in the interpretation of creativity, by analogy with misterianism in the understanding of consciousness by K. McGinn. In this case, the randomization technique is nothing more than one of the possible conditions for creativity, which cannot guarantee the appearance of an original result.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128607495","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the polemic with T.D. Sokolova’s article the issue is discussed addressing the question whether there is anything new that we can get from the methodology of interdisciplinarity and trans-disciplinarity for determination of scientific rationality and scientific progress. The solution of this question is connected with the intensions of a historical and social-cultural epistemologies. These intentions consist in a complex or “multidimensional” approach to the creation of conceptual designs that define the application of these concepts. None of the "measurements” (methodological, psychological, social, etc.) provides them with a universal definition, but a “stereometric” image “restored” from them is capable to approximate to real use of these concepts of an epistemology and philosophy of science. It is necessary to remember that progress in science in one dimension can be regression in another just as the scientific rationality in a sociological dimension can be in no correspondence with the interpretation of rationality given to it by a certain methodological conception. Philosophy of science must avoid a dogmatic universalization of the criteria of rationality as well as the extremes of of relativism in this question.
{"title":"On the Multidimensionality of Scientific Rationality and Scientific Progress","authors":"V. Porus","doi":"10.5840/eps202360223","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202360223","url":null,"abstract":"In the polemic with T.D. Sokolova’s article the issue is discussed addressing the question whether there is anything new that we can get from the methodology of interdisciplinarity and trans-disciplinarity for determination of scientific rationality and scientific progress. The solution of this question is connected with the intensions of a historical and social-cultural epistemologies. These intentions consist in a complex or “multidimensional” approach to the creation of conceptual designs that define the application of these concepts. None of the \"measurements” (methodological, psychological, social, etc.) provides them with a universal definition, but a “stereometric” image “restored” from them is capable to approximate to real use of these concepts of an epistemology and philosophy of science. It is necessary to remember that progress in science in one dimension can be regression in another just as the scientific rationality in a sociological dimension can be in no correspondence with the interpretation of rationality given to it by a certain methodological conception. Philosophy of science must avoid a dogmatic universalization of the criteria of rationality as well as the extremes of of relativism in this question.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116354157","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this article, I want to show that the concept “rationality”, which is important for the French school of epistemology of science, has a dual content and is not very successful. This is the main point of my polemic with Tatyana Sokolova. On the one hand, there seems to be general rationality in it, understood as a preference (in the broad sense) for benefits over costs. Benefits include true knowledge. On the other hand, there is a historical socio-cultural context in which scientific knowledge arises and in which the parameters of practice are determined, which serves as the final instance for testing knowledge. At the same time, there are many such contexts in society, which I call human interfaces. The world, for its part, offers many of its interfaces as collections of interaction tools. When some interface of a person and some interface of the world assimilate each other, knowledge arises, that is confirmed by practice. It can be considered rational. But with a change in the sociocultural context, the human interface also changes, so that a search for new assimilation takes place. It is carried out by science. I agree with Tatyana Sokolova’s characterization of the progress of science, but I suggest at least differentiating the levels of rationality. One operates in the historical sociocultural locus, the other ensures the change of such loci and the adaptation of knowledge to them. I consider the progress of science to be an evaluative characteristic; no objectively recorded phenomenon corresponds to it. The disciplinary distinction of science is derived from the concepts of “object” and “method”, which have a performative content.
{"title":"Progress of Science and Interfaces of the World","authors":"I. Mikirtumov","doi":"10.5840/eps202360221","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202360221","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, I want to show that the concept “rationality”, which is important for the French school of epistemology of science, has a dual content and is not very successful. This is the main point of my polemic with Tatyana Sokolova. On the one hand, there seems to be general rationality in it, understood as a preference (in the broad sense) for benefits over costs. Benefits include true knowledge. On the other hand, there is a historical socio-cultural context in which scientific knowledge arises and in which the parameters of practice are determined, which serves as the final instance for testing knowledge. At the same time, there are many such contexts in society, which I call human interfaces. The world, for its part, offers many of its interfaces as collections of interaction tools. When some interface of a person and some interface of the world assimilate each other, knowledge arises, that is confirmed by practice. It can be considered rational. But with a change in the sociocultural context, the human interface also changes, so that a search for new assimilation takes place. It is carried out by science. I agree with Tatyana Sokolova’s characterization of the progress of science, but I suggest at least differentiating the levels of rationality. One operates in the historical sociocultural locus, the other ensures the change of such loci and the adaptation of knowledge to them. I consider the progress of science to be an evaluative characteristic; no objectively recorded phenomenon corresponds to it. The disciplinary distinction of science is derived from the concepts of “object” and “method”, which have a performative content.","PeriodicalId":369041,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116499356","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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