Alibaba: A Case Study of Synthetic Control

J. Fried, Ehud Kamar
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

Alibaba, the NYSE-traded Chinese ecommerce giant, is currently valued at over $500 billion. But Alibaba’s governance is opaque, obscuring who controls the firm. We show that Jack Ma, who now owns only about 5%, can effectively control Alibaba by controlling an entirely different firm: Ant Group. We demonstrate how control of Ant Group enables Ma to dominate Alibaba’s board. We also explain how this control gives Ma the indirect ability to disable (and perhaps seize) VIE-held licenses critical to Alibaba, providing him with substantial additional leverage. Alibaba is a case study of how corporate control can be created synthetically with little or no equity ownership via a web of employment and contractual arrangements.
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阿里巴巴:综合控制的案例研究
阿里巴巴是在纽约证券交易所上市的中国电子商务巨头,目前估值超过5000亿美元。但阿里巴巴的管理是不透明的,使谁控制着公司变得模糊。我们表明,目前只拥有阿里巴巴5%股份的马云,可以通过控制一家完全不同的公司——蚂蚁集团(Ant Group)来有效控制阿里巴巴。我们展示了对蚂蚁集团的控制如何使马云主宰阿里巴巴的董事会。我们还解释了这种控制如何使马云间接地能够禁用(甚至可能夺取)vie持有的对阿里巴巴至关重要的许可证,为他提供了大量额外的杠杆。阿里巴巴是一个案例研究,说明如何通过雇佣和合同安排的网络,在很少或根本没有股权的情况下,综合创造出企业控制权。
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