Shorting in Speculative Markets

Marcel Nutz, J. Scheinkman
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引用次数: 14

Abstract

We propose a continuous-time model of trading among risk-neutral agents with heterogeneous beliefs. Agents face quadratic costs-of-carry on their positions and as a consequence, their marginal valuation of the asset decreases when the magnitude of their position increases, as it would be the case for risk-averse agents. In the equilibrium models of investors with heterogeneous beliefs that followed the original work by Harrison and Kreps, investors are risk-neutral, short-selling is prohibited and agents face a constant marginal cost of carrying positions. The resulting resale option guarantees that the equilibrium price exceeds the price of the asset in a static buy-and-hold model where speculation is ruled out. Our model features three main novelties. First, increasing marginal costs entail that the price depends on the exogenous supply. Second, in addition to the resale option, agents may also value an option to delay, and this may cause the market to equilibrate below the static buy-and-hold price. Third, we introduce the possibility of short-selling; then the resale option for agents with short positions partly compensates the resale option for long agents. We characterize the unique equilibrium of our model through a Hamilton--Jacobi--Bellman equation of a novel form and use it to derive several comparative statics results.
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投机市场中的卖空行为
我们提出了一个具有异质信念的风险中性代理人之间的连续时间交易模型。代理人在其仓位上面临二次的持有成本,因此,当他们的仓位增加时,他们对资产的边际估值就会下降,就像风险厌恶者的情况一样。在哈里森(Harrison)和克雷普斯(Kreps)的原创作品之后,具有异质信念的投资者的均衡模型中,投资者是风险中性的,卖空被禁止,代理人面临持有头寸的恒定边际成本。由此产生的转售期权保证了均衡价格超过静态买入并持有模式下的资产价格,在这种模式下,投机行为被排除在外。我们的模型主要有三个新颖之处。首先,边际成本的增加导致价格取决于外生供给。其次,除了转售期权,代理人也可能重视延迟期权,这可能导致市场在静态买入并持有价格以下达到平衡。第三,我们引入了卖空的可能性;然后,持有空头头寸的代理商的转售期权部分补偿了持有多头头寸的代理商的转售期权。我们通过一种新颖形式的Hamilton- Jacobi- Bellman方程来表征我们模型的独特平衡,并使用它来推导几个比较静力学结果。
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