Gettier Cases, Knowledge and Experimental Inquiry

A. Ward
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Abstract

In 1963, Edmund Gettier published a short paper in the journal Analysis. That paper, entitled “Is Justifi ed True Belief Knowledge?,” purported to demonstrate that even though a person is justified in believing a true proposition p, having that justified true belief (JTB) is not sufficient for the person knowing that p (Gettier, 1963). In particular, Gettier presented examples purporting to show that a person may have a justified true belief, but the belief is, in one way or another, a “lucky belief,” and so the person having the justified true belief that p does not know that p. In what follows, I argue that justified, but luckily true beliefs do count as knowledge. What is important is that there is a limited ability to generalize from such cases, suggesting that many, if not most of what we count as instances of knowledge are, to a greater or lesser extent, localized.
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案例、知识与实验探究
1963年,埃德蒙·格蒂尔在《分析》杂志上发表了一篇短文。那篇论文的题目是“被证明是真信念的知识吗?”,意在证明,即使一个人有理由相信一个真命题p,拥有这个被证明的真信念(JTB)对于这个人知道p是不够的(Gettier, 1963)。特别地,Gettier举了一些例子来证明一个人可能有一个被证明是正确的真信念,但这个信念在某种程度上是一个"幸运信念"因此,有一个被证明是正确的真信念p的人并不知道p,在接下来的内容中,我认为被证明是正确的,但幸运的真信念确实算作知识。重要的是,从这些案例中进行概括的能力是有限的,这表明,即使我们认为的知识实例不是大多数,也有许多或多或少是局部的。
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