How Governments Choose Their Creditors

Jonas B. Bunte
{"title":"How Governments Choose Their Creditors","authors":"Jonas B. Bunte","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190866167.003.0002","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter introduces a demand-side theory to explain how governments choose their creditors. Labor, Industry, and Finance are important interest groups in recipient countries. Their governments can borrow from four types of creditors: Western governments, BRIC governments, multilateral institutions, and private creditors. These creditors may offer the same loan amount, but the strings attached to their loans differ. Therefore, the expected distributional consequences of a particular loan differ across domestic interest groups. Policymakers try to satisfy the two most influential groups simultaneously by borrowing from the creditor that is jointly preferred by both groups. A government will rely on loans from BRICs if a Corporatist Coalition between Labor and Industry dominates the political landscape. In contrast, governments will tend to borrow from private creditors if a Capital Coalition between Finance and Industry predominates, but will obtain loans by Western governments if faced with a Consumer Coalition between Labor and Finance.","PeriodicalId":379488,"journal":{"name":"Raise the Debt","volume":"492 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Raise the Debt","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190866167.003.0002","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

This chapter introduces a demand-side theory to explain how governments choose their creditors. Labor, Industry, and Finance are important interest groups in recipient countries. Their governments can borrow from four types of creditors: Western governments, BRIC governments, multilateral institutions, and private creditors. These creditors may offer the same loan amount, but the strings attached to their loans differ. Therefore, the expected distributional consequences of a particular loan differ across domestic interest groups. Policymakers try to satisfy the two most influential groups simultaneously by borrowing from the creditor that is jointly preferred by both groups. A government will rely on loans from BRICs if a Corporatist Coalition between Labor and Industry dominates the political landscape. In contrast, governments will tend to borrow from private creditors if a Capital Coalition between Finance and Industry predominates, but will obtain loans by Western governments if faced with a Consumer Coalition between Labor and Finance.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
政府如何选择债权人
本章引入需求侧理论来解释政府如何选择债权人。劳工、工业和金融是受援国重要的利益集团。这些国家的政府可以向四种类型的债权人借款:西方政府、金砖四国政府、多边机构和私人债权人。这些债权人可能提供相同的贷款金额,但贷款附带的条件不同。因此,一笔特定贷款的预期分配结果在国内各利益集团之间是不同的。政策制定者试图同时满足两个最有影响力的群体,方法是向两个群体共同青睐的债权人借款。如果工党和工业界组成的社团主义联盟主导政治格局,政府将依赖金砖四国的贷款。相反,如果金融和工业之间的资本联盟占主导地位,政府将倾向于向私人债权人借款,但如果面临劳工和金融之间的消费者联盟,政府将获得西方政府的贷款。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
How Governments Choose Their Creditors Explaining Variation in Borrowing Portfolios Measuring Borrowing Portfolios and Group Strength Tracing the Process of Borrowing with Fieldwork Governments’ Borrowing Decisions across the Developing World
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1