{"title":"Contests With Participant-Dependent Prizes","authors":"Nicolas de Roos, Alexander Matros, V. Smirnov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3804612","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We study contests in which the prize depends on the number of participants, and show that equilibrium effort can be increasing, decreasing, or non-monotonic in the number of participants. This contrasts with the standard result for contests with fixed prizes in which effort is decreasing in the number of participants.","PeriodicalId":198334,"journal":{"name":"Labor: Personnel Economics eJournal","volume":"220 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Labor: Personnel Economics eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3804612","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
We study contests in which the prize depends on the number of participants, and show that equilibrium effort can be increasing, decreasing, or non-monotonic in the number of participants. This contrasts with the standard result for contests with fixed prizes in which effort is decreasing in the number of participants.
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