We study firm responses to a large‐scale change in apprenticeship regulation in Colombia. The reform requires firms to train, setting apprentice quotas that vary discontinuously in firm size. We document strong heterogeneity in responses across sectors, where firms in sectors with high skill requirements tend to avoid training apprentices, while firms in low‐skill sectors seek apprentices. Guided by these reduced‐form findings, we structurally estimate firms' training costs. Especially in high‐skill sectors, many firms face large training costs, limiting their willingness to train apprentices. Yet, we find substantial overall benefits of expanding apprenticeship training, in particular when the supply of trained workers increases in general equilibrium. Finally, we show that counterfactual policies taking into account heterogeneity across sectors can deliver similar benefits from training while inducing less distortions in the firm‐size distribution and in the allocation of resources across sectors.
{"title":"Unwilling to Train? Firm Responses to the Colombian Apprenticeship Regulation","authors":"S. Caicedo, Miguel Espinosa, Arthur Seibold","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3707938","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3707938","url":null,"abstract":"We study firm responses to a large‐scale change in apprenticeship regulation in Colombia. The reform requires firms to train, setting apprentice quotas that vary discontinuously in firm size. We document strong heterogeneity in responses across sectors, where firms in sectors with high skill requirements tend to avoid training apprentices, while firms in low‐skill sectors seek apprentices. Guided by these reduced‐form findings, we structurally estimate firms' training costs. Especially in high‐skill sectors, many firms face large training costs, limiting their willingness to train apprentices. Yet, we find substantial overall benefits of expanding apprenticeship training, in particular when the supply of trained workers increases in general equilibrium. Finally, we show that counterfactual policies taking into account heterogeneity across sectors can deliver similar benefits from training while inducing less distortions in the firm‐size distribution and in the allocation of resources across sectors.","PeriodicalId":198334,"journal":{"name":"Labor: Personnel Economics eJournal","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134235272","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study how salary history disclosures affect employer demand, and how salary history bans shape hiring and wages. We show how these effects depend on the properties of the labor market and measure the key properties using a novel, two-sided field experiment. Our field experiment features hundreds of recruiters and over two thousand job applications. We randomize the presence of salary history questions as well as job candidates' disclosures. We find that employers make negative inferences about non-disclosing candidates, and anticipate positive selection into disclosure. Recruiters view salary history as a stronger signal about competing options than about worker quality. Disclosures by men (and other highly-paid candidates) yield higher salary offers, however they are negative signals of value (net of salary), and thus yield fewer callbacks. While disclosures (especially high amounts) generally increase recruiter beliefs about quality and competing offers, male wage premiums are regarded as a weaker signal of quality than other sources (such as the premiums from working at higher paying firms, or being well-paid compared to peers). Recruiters correctly anticipate that women are less likely to disclose salary history at any level, and thus punish women less than men for silence. When we simulate the effect of salary history bans using our results, we find muted effects on callbacks. Gender inequality in salary offers is reduced; however equality comes at the expense of lower salary offers overall (and especially for men).
{"title":"Salary History and Employer Demand: Evidence from a Two-Sided Audit","authors":"Amanda Y. Agan, Bo Cowgill, Laura K. Gee","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3929578","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3929578","url":null,"abstract":"We study how salary history disclosures affect employer demand, and how salary history bans shape hiring and wages. We show how these effects depend on the properties of the labor market and measure the key properties using a novel, two-sided field experiment. Our field experiment features hundreds of recruiters and over two thousand job applications. We randomize the presence of salary history questions as well as job candidates' disclosures. We find that employers make negative inferences about non-disclosing candidates, and anticipate positive selection into disclosure. Recruiters view salary history as a stronger signal about competing options than about worker quality. Disclosures by men (and other highly-paid candidates) yield higher salary offers, however they are negative signals of value (net of salary), and thus yield fewer callbacks. While disclosures (especially high amounts) generally increase recruiter beliefs about quality and competing offers, male wage premiums are regarded as a weaker signal of quality than other sources (such as the premiums from working at higher paying firms, or being well-paid compared to peers). Recruiters correctly anticipate that women are less likely to disclose salary history at any level, and thus punish women less than men for silence. When we simulate the effect of salary history bans using our results, we find muted effects on callbacks. Gender inequality in salary offers is reduced; however equality comes at the expense of lower salary offers overall (and especially for men).","PeriodicalId":198334,"journal":{"name":"Labor: Personnel Economics eJournal","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117215502","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Sunanda Bosu, M. Haque, Shomrita Barua, Kazi Md. Israfil, Aninda Sen, Md. Mahmud Al Hasan
Health assistants play an important role in providing primary health care among the rural population in Bangladesh. Their improper working performance can hamper the entire nations’ health care. Proper productivity is related to the job satisfaction and job satisfaction is the result of attitude and behavior. The purpose of this study was to assess the job satisfaction level among health assistants working in selected Upazila Health Complex (UHC). 203 health assistants were interviewed through purposive sampling technique from four UHCs in the Dhaka district. Out of 203 respondents, 114 were female and 89 were male where Mean± SD was 38.80 ±7.62. The highest 109 (53.7%) participants had 1-10 years of working experience and 104 (51.2%) respondents had monthly income between 18000 -23000 BDTK. The percentage of neutral, satisfied and unsatisfied participants’ was 65%, 28% and 7%, respectively. There was significant (P < 0.05) relationship between job satisfaction and getting medical allowance, training opportunity and salary. Job nature such as security, meaningless, pride and enjoying, support colleagues such as supervisor and coworkers, acceptance by both the community and oneself were identified as the satisfied items where low and fair opportunities for promotion, low increment, and low pay, no praise, high work pressure, and null administrative capacity were found as dissatisfied factors of job. On the basis of these findings, policy makers and concerned authorities could take necessary steps for increasing the level of job satisfaction of health assistants.
{"title":"Job Satisfaction of Health Assistants in Selected Upazila Health Complexes of Bangladesh","authors":"Sunanda Bosu, M. Haque, Shomrita Barua, Kazi Md. Israfil, Aninda Sen, Md. Mahmud Al Hasan","doi":"10.31219/osf.io/rcx4d","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31219/osf.io/rcx4d","url":null,"abstract":"Health assistants play an important role in providing primary health care among the rural population in Bangladesh. Their improper working performance can hamper the entire nations’ health care. Proper productivity is related to the job satisfaction and job satisfaction is the result of attitude and behavior. The purpose of this study was to assess the job satisfaction level among health assistants working in selected Upazila Health Complex (UHC). 203 health assistants were interviewed through purposive sampling technique from four UHCs in the Dhaka district. Out of 203 respondents, 114 were female and 89 were male where Mean± SD was 38.80 ±7.62. The highest 109 (53.7%) participants had 1-10 years of working experience and 104 (51.2%) respondents had monthly income between 18000 -23000 BDTK. The percentage of neutral, satisfied and unsatisfied participants’ was 65%, 28% and 7%, respectively. There was significant (P < 0.05) relationship between job satisfaction and getting medical allowance, training opportunity and salary. Job nature such as security, meaningless, pride and enjoying, support colleagues such as supervisor and coworkers, acceptance by both the community and oneself were identified as the satisfied items where low and fair opportunities for promotion, low increment, and low pay, no praise, high work pressure, and null administrative capacity were found as dissatisfied factors of job. On the basis of these findings, policy makers and concerned authorities could take necessary steps for increasing the level of job satisfaction of health assistants.","PeriodicalId":198334,"journal":{"name":"Labor: Personnel Economics eJournal","volume":"7 11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129283534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In his last season as professional football player, Johan Cruyff played at Feyenoord. This paper shows that Cruyff improved the performance of his team and provides evidence of his presence attracting more stadium attendants to the home ground. From this it is concluded that Cruyff made a superstar contribution to his club Feyenoord.
{"title":"Johan Cruyff and his Contribution to Success and Stadium Attendance at Feyenoord","authors":"J. van Ours","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3905947","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3905947","url":null,"abstract":"In his last season as professional football player, Johan Cruyff played at Feyenoord. This paper shows that Cruyff improved the performance of his team and provides evidence of his presence attracting more stadium attendants to the home ground. From this it is concluded that Cruyff made a superstar contribution to his club Feyenoord.","PeriodicalId":198334,"journal":{"name":"Labor: Personnel Economics eJournal","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121850297","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Firms with workplace sexual harassment risk are reluctant to disclose such information. However, rank-and-file employees may reveal harassment information via anonymous job reviews. We investigate whether a measure of sexual harassment (SH score) constructed by performing textual analysis of online job reviews contains value-relevant information that affects firm performance. We find that SH reveals significant future problems for firms in terms of profitability, labor costs, and stock performance. In our sample firms during 2011-2017, high SH scores are associated with sharp declines in operating profitability and increases in labor costs. Firms in the top quantiles (top 1% to 5%) of the SH score earned lower risk-adjusted stock returns, representing an annual shareholder value loss of $0.8 to $1.4 billion per harassment-prone firm. These results indicate that sexual harassment has a highly detrimental effect on firm value, and employee voluntary reporting can be a valid disclosure mechanism when firms are disincentivized to reveal bad news. This research highlights the value-relevance of information held by rank-and-file employees, including information about possible corporate misconduct.
{"title":"Employee Sexual Harassment Reviews and Firm Value","authors":"Shiu-Yik Au, Ming Dong, A. Tremblay","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3437444","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3437444","url":null,"abstract":"Firms with workplace sexual harassment risk are reluctant to disclose such information. However, rank-and-file employees may reveal harassment information via anonymous job reviews. We investigate whether a measure of sexual harassment (SH score) constructed by performing textual analysis of online job reviews contains value-relevant information that affects firm performance. We find that SH reveals significant future problems for firms in terms of profitability, labor costs, and stock performance. In our sample firms during 2011-2017, high SH scores are associated with sharp declines in operating profitability and increases in labor costs. Firms in the top quantiles (top 1% to 5%) of the SH score earned lower risk-adjusted stock returns, representing an annual shareholder value loss of $0.8 to $1.4 billion per harassment-prone firm. These results indicate that sexual harassment has a highly detrimental effect on firm value, and employee voluntary reporting can be a valid disclosure mechanism when firms are disincentivized to reveal bad news. This research highlights the value-relevance of information held by rank-and-file employees, including information about possible corporate misconduct.","PeriodicalId":198334,"journal":{"name":"Labor: Personnel Economics eJournal","volume":"257 2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116417327","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
To investigate whether managers' subjective performance evaluations and personnel decisions distinguish between effects of luck and effort on employees' performance outcomes, I use a regression discontinuity design that compares the performance ratings and contracting outcomes of professional football players involved in narrow victories (‘lucky’ outcomes) with those of players involved in narrow defeats (‘unlucky’ outcomes). Although the informativeness principle shows that supervisors' evaluations should filter out the effect of luck on subordinates' outcomes, theory in psychology suggests that random variation in outcomes may nonetheless affect evaluators' judgments. In line with this theory, I show that unlucky losses cause coaches to lower their subjective player performance ratings and, in turn, drop more players from the team's starting line-up. To shed light on the mechanisms that give rise to these results, I present evidence that suggests that these effects are driven by managers explicitly conflating luck and effort, and by managers' use of outcome-based search heuristics. Overall, my findings extend research on the degree to which firms' use of subjectivity in evaluating and rewarding employees can effectively reduce incentive problems in practice.
{"title":"Do managers distinguish between effects of luck and effort on employees' performance outcomes? Evidence from a high-stakes field setting","authors":"Patrick J. Ferguson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3894211","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3894211","url":null,"abstract":"To investigate whether managers' subjective performance evaluations and personnel decisions distinguish between effects of luck and effort on employees' performance outcomes, I use a regression discontinuity design that compares the performance ratings and contracting outcomes of professional football players involved in narrow victories (‘lucky’ outcomes) with those of players involved in narrow defeats (‘unlucky’ outcomes). Although the informativeness principle shows that supervisors' evaluations should filter out the effect of luck on subordinates' outcomes, theory in psychology suggests that random variation in outcomes may nonetheless affect evaluators' judgments. In line with this theory, I show that unlucky losses cause coaches to lower their subjective player performance ratings and, in turn, drop more players from the team's starting line-up. To shed light on the mechanisms that give rise to these results, I present evidence that suggests that these effects are driven by managers explicitly conflating luck and effort, and by managers' use of outcome-based search heuristics. Overall, my findings extend research on the degree to which firms' use of subjectivity in evaluating and rewarding employees can effectively reduce incentive problems in practice.","PeriodicalId":198334,"journal":{"name":"Labor: Personnel Economics eJournal","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128296014","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A sporting contest organizer needs to consider the network effect exerted by the present spectators that affects the decision of the athletes decision to participate in the contest. Talented athletes can boost their popularity by winning the contest; this can result in increased attendance at the contest, which can enhance the organizer’s profit. However, external funding by public authorities or sponsors is necessary to ensure a break.
{"title":"Sporting Contests with Network Effects","authors":"Arne Aarnink, Andreas Goetsch","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3889342","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3889342","url":null,"abstract":"A sporting contest organizer needs to consider the network effect exerted by the present spectators that affects the decision of the athletes decision to participate in the contest. Talented athletes can boost their popularity by winning the contest; this can result in increased attendance at the contest, which can enhance the organizer’s profit. However, external funding by public authorities or sponsors is necessary to ensure a break.","PeriodicalId":198334,"journal":{"name":"Labor: Personnel Economics eJournal","volume":"69 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116167040","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Although contests are recognized theoretically as a highly effective method of motivation, the competitive nature of contests may generate unintended negative effects on social interactions in more general settings beyond contests. Using a laboratory experiment of real effort tasks with treatments varying by compensation schemes (all-pay auction contest, Tullock contest, proportional prize contest, and piece rate payment scheme), we test the relative effect of contest formats on pro-social behavior as measured by choices in social dilemma games. Compared to a ranking of compensation schemes based on the correspondence between effort exerted and reward received, our results provide relatively stronger support for the idea that cooperative behavior after a competition is tied to the potential for obtaining ‘fair’ payoff outcomes within the contest. Our random re-matching experimental design ensures that our findings do not result from subjects’ rivalry towards specific competitors, but rather represents a more fundamental shift in prosocial attitude. The results have managerial consequences for structuring incentives in the workplace when a combination of competition and cooperation is necessary among workers.
{"title":"The Cooperative Consequences of Contests","authors":"J. Lien, Jie Zheng, Yilin Zhuo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3850570","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3850570","url":null,"abstract":"Although contests are recognized theoretically as a highly effective method of motivation, the competitive nature of contests may generate unintended negative effects on social interactions in more general settings beyond contests. Using a laboratory experiment of real effort tasks with treatments varying by compensation schemes (all-pay auction contest, Tullock contest, proportional prize contest, and piece rate payment scheme), we test the relative effect of contest formats on pro-social behavior as measured by choices in social dilemma games. Compared to a ranking of compensation schemes based on the correspondence between effort exerted and reward received, our results provide relatively stronger support for the idea that cooperative behavior after a competition is tied to the potential for obtaining ‘fair’ payoff outcomes within the contest. Our random re-matching experimental design ensures that our findings do not result from subjects’ rivalry towards specific competitors, but rather represents a more fundamental shift in prosocial attitude. The results have managerial consequences for structuring incentives in the workplace when a combination of competition and cooperation is necessary among workers.","PeriodicalId":198334,"journal":{"name":"Labor: Personnel Economics eJournal","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117123580","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study productivity before and during the working from home [WFH] period of the COVID-19 pandemic, using personnel and analytics data from over 10,000 skilled professionals at a large Asian IT services company. Hours worked increased, including a rise of 18% outside normal business hours. Average output declined slightly, thus productivity fell 8-19%. We then analyze determinants of changes in productivity. Employees with children at home increased work hours more and had a larger decline in productivity than those without children. Women had a larger decline in productivity, while those with longer company tenure fared better. An important source of changes in WFH productivity is higher communication and coordination costs. Time spent on coordination activities and meetings increased, while uninterrupted work hours shrank considerably. Employees communicated with fewer individuals and business units, both inside and outside the firm. They also received less coaching and 1:1 meetings with supervisors. The findings suggest key issues for firms to address in implementing WFH policies.
{"title":"Work from Home & Productivity: Evidence from Personnel & Analytics Data on IT Professionals","authors":"Michael J. Gibbs, F. Mengel, Christoph Siemroth","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3841457","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3841457","url":null,"abstract":"We study productivity before and during the working from home [WFH] period of the COVID-19 pandemic, using personnel and analytics data from over 10,000 skilled professionals at a large Asian IT services company. Hours worked increased, including a rise of 18% outside normal business hours. Average output declined slightly, thus productivity fell 8-19%. We then analyze determinants of changes in productivity. Employees with children at home increased work hours more and had a larger decline in productivity than those without children. Women had a larger decline in productivity, while those with longer company tenure fared better. An important source of changes in WFH productivity is higher communication and coordination costs. Time spent on coordination activities and meetings increased, while uninterrupted work hours shrank considerably. Employees communicated with fewer individuals and business units, both inside and outside the firm. They also received less coaching and 1:1 meetings with supervisors. The findings suggest key issues for firms to address in implementing WFH policies.<br>","PeriodicalId":198334,"journal":{"name":"Labor: Personnel Economics eJournal","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122129064","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study a simple savings scheme that allows workers to defer receipt of part of their wages for three months at zero interest. The scheme significantly increases savings during the deferral period, leading to higher post-disbursement spending on lumpy goods. Two years later, after two additional rounds of the savings scheme, we find that treated workers have made permanent improvements to their homes. The popularity of the scheme implies a lack of good alternative savings options. The results of a follow-up experiment suggest that demand for the scheme is partly due to its ability to address self-control issues.
{"title":"Pay Me Later: Savings Constraints and the Demand for Deferred Payments","authors":"Lasse Brune, Eric T. Chyn, J. Kerwin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3822087","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3822087","url":null,"abstract":"We study a simple savings scheme that allows workers to defer receipt of part of their wages for three months at zero interest. The scheme significantly increases savings during the deferral period, leading to higher post-disbursement spending on lumpy goods. Two years later, after two additional rounds of the savings scheme, we find that treated workers have made permanent improvements to their homes. The popularity of the scheme implies a lack of good alternative savings options. The results of a follow-up experiment suggest that demand for the scheme is partly due to its ability to address self-control issues.","PeriodicalId":198334,"journal":{"name":"Labor: Personnel Economics eJournal","volume":"110 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128280455","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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