Quantum Game of Dual-channel Supply Chain under Free-riding Behavior

Yu-Chung Chang
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Abstract

Based on the perspective of the quantum game, this paper explores when the online direct sales channel takes the free-riding behavior after the retail channel provides high-quality experience and services and how the dual-channel supply chain establishes a commodity pricing strategy. The retailer’s selling price follows a decreasing function of the free-riding behavior coefficient. while the online direct selling price does an increasing function of the free-riding behavior coefficient. Under centralized decision-making, there is no quantum entanglement, so the quantum game solution is consistent with the classical game solution. Under decentralized decision-making, the optimal price and profit of the quantum game are higher than those of the classical game when the quantum entanglement degree is greater than zero. When the quantum entanglement tends to be infinite, the optimal price of the quantum game finally remains in convergence. The quantum game theory is a more optimal decision-making method than the classical game theory.
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搭便车行为下双通道供应链的量子博弈
本文基于量子博弈的视角,探讨了当零售渠道提供优质的体验和服务后,在线直销渠道何时会采取搭便车行为,双渠道供应链如何建立商品定价策略。零售商的销售价格遵循搭便车行为系数的递减函数。而网络直销价格是搭便车行为系数的递增函数。在集中决策下,不存在量子纠缠,因此量子博弈解与经典博弈解是一致的。在去中心化决策下,当量子纠缠度大于零时,量子博弈的最优价格和利润都高于经典博弈。当量子纠缠趋于无穷大时,量子博弈的最优价格最终保持收敛。量子博弈论是一种比经典博弈论更优的决策方法。
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