Closing the Revolving Door:

Joseph Kalmenovitz, Siddharth Vij, Kairong Xiao
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Abstract

Regulators can leave their government position for a job in a regulated firm. Using granular payroll data on 22 million federal employees, we uncover the first causal evidence of revolving door incentives. We exploit the fact that post-employment restrictions on federal employees, which reduce the value of their outside option, trigger when the employee’s base salary exceeds a threshold. We document significant bunching of employees just below the threshold, consistent with a deliberate effort to preserve the value of their outside option. The effect is concentrated among agencies with broad regulatory powers, minimal supervision by elected officials, and frequent interactions with high-paying industries. In those agencies, 31% of the regulators respond to revolving door incentives and sacrifice 15% of their wage potential to stay below the threshold. Consistent with theories of regulatory capture, we find that revolving regulators issue fewer rules and rules with lower costs of compliance. Using our findings to calibrate a structural model, we show that eliminating the restriction will increase the incentive distortion in the federal government by 1.3%. Combined, our results shed new light on the economic implications of the revolving door in the government.
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关闭旋转门:
监管人员可以离开政府职位,到受监管的公司工作。利用2200万联邦雇员的精细工资单数据,我们发现了旋转门激励的第一个因果证据。我们利用了这样一个事实,即当雇员的基本工资超过一个阈值时,联邦雇员的离职后限制就会触发,这降低了他们的外部期权的价值。我们记录了大量低于门槛的员工,这与刻意保留外部期权价值的努力是一致的。这种影响主要集中在拥有广泛监管权力、民选官员监督最少、与高薪行业频繁互动的机构身上。在这些机构中,31%的监管人员对旋转门激励做出了回应,牺牲了15%的工资潜力,以保持在门槛以下。与监管捕获理论一致,我们发现循环监管机构发布的规则更少,合规成本更低。使用我们的研究结果来校准一个结构模型,我们表明取消限制将使联邦政府的激励扭曲增加1.3%。综合来看,我们的研究结果揭示了政府旋转门对经济的影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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