The Quasi-Empirical Epistemology of Mathematics

E. Shi
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Abstract

Abstract This paper clarifies and discusses Imre Lakatos’ claim that mathematics is quasi-empirical in one of his less-discussed papers A Renaissance of Empiricism in the Recent Philosophy of Mathematics. I argue that (1) Lakatos’ motivation for classifying mathematics as a quasi-empirical theory is epistemological; (2) what can be called the quasi-empirical epistemology of mathematics is not correct; (3) analysing where the quasi-empirical epistemology of mathematics goes wrong will bring to light reasons to endorse a pluralist view of mathematics.
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数学的准经验认识论
摘要本文澄清并讨论了Imre Lakatos在其较少讨论的论文《近代数学哲学中经验主义的复兴》中关于数学是准经验主义的主张。我认为:(1)拉卡托斯将数学分类为准经验理论的动机是认识论的;(2)所谓准经验的数学认识论是不正确的;(3)分析数学准经验认识论的错误之处,将揭示支持多元数学观的理由。
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