How to Make Money while Running from the Cops

C. Hummel
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Abstract

Chapter 6 develops the theory in a comparative context, by adding case studies of organized and unorganized street vendors and the city governments that they interact with in El Alto, Bolivia and two districts in São Paulo, Brazil. The chapter is based on original interview, survey, participant observation, and ethnographic data that was collected during a total of three months in each city over four research trips in 2012, 2014 to 2015, 2018, and 2019. As part of the project, the author briefly sold selfie sticks as a street vendor in a central district of São Paulo in 2015. Comparing the city of La Paz to the neighboring city of El Alto holds many national-level features constant but varies city government enforcement capacity. Comparing two districts in São Paulo to each other and then La Paz and El Alto adds more variation on enforcement capacity. São Paulo, the large, modern metropolis of the region’s richest country, with many employment opportunities, services, stable laws, and a history of labor organizing, should have more organized street vendors than La Paz, according to resource- or political context-based theories of collective action. Instead, only 2 percent of São Paulo’s 100,000 vendors are organized, compared to 75 percent of La Paz’s 60,000. I explain this difference with the interaction between individual resources, official incentives, and local government enforcement capacity.
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如何在逃避警察的同时赚钱
第6章在比较的背景下发展了这一理论,增加了有组织和无组织的街头小贩以及他们在玻利维亚埃尔阿尔托和巴西圣保罗两个地区与之互动的市政府的案例研究。本章基于原始访谈、调查、参与者观察和民族志数据,这些数据是在2012年、2014年至2015年、2018年和2019年四次研究旅行中在每个城市收集的,共三个月。作为该项目的一部分,作者于2015年在圣保罗中心区短暂地以街头小贩的身份出售自拍杆。将拉巴斯市与邻近的埃尔阿尔托市进行比较,可以发现许多国家层面的特征是不变的,但城市政府的执法能力各不相同。比较圣保罗的两个地区然后拉巴斯和埃尔阿尔托的执法能力增加了更多的变化。圣保罗是该地区最富裕国家的大型现代化大都市,拥有许多就业机会、服务、稳定的法律和劳工组织的历史,根据基于资源或政治背景的集体行动理论,它应该比拉巴斯有更多有组织的街头摊贩。相反,在圣保罗的10万名摊贩中,只有2%是有组织的,而在拉巴斯的6万名摊贩中,这一比例为75%。我用个人资源、官方激励和地方政府执行能力之间的相互作用来解释这种差异。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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Why Do Informal Workers Organize? State Intervention in Collective Action Street Markets in La Paz and São Paulo Informal Work in Numbers Conclusion
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