Do You Hear the People’s Saying? - The Voice of Individual Investors

Jacky Chau, Shufang Lai, Yong George Yang
{"title":"Do You Hear the People’s Saying? - The Voice of Individual Investors","authors":"Jacky Chau, Shufang Lai, Yong George Yang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3721526","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In a setting where regulators provide a curated online platform to facilitate management access by individual investors, we examine the “voice” of individual shareholders in their interaction with firm management. We find that the timing and content of online postings directed to management from individual investors are generally responsive to significant corporate events. Besides information acquisition, individual investors sometimes convey criticisms and suggestions to management. Individual investors collectively turn more active in their online engagements with management when there are signs of weaker external monitoring from institutional investors or weaker managerial incentive alignment with shareholders. Individual investors also tend to step up their engagement efforts after their followed firm experiences poor performance. Additionally, we observe increased engagements by individual investors during securities rules violations and these engagements are associated with sooner enforcement actions on the violations. Our findings suggest that, empowered by a conducive regulatory environment, individual investors could manifest active monitoring incentives when the perceived benefits are sufficiently high.","PeriodicalId":429515,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)","volume":"105 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"6","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3721526","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6

Abstract

In a setting where regulators provide a curated online platform to facilitate management access by individual investors, we examine the “voice” of individual shareholders in their interaction with firm management. We find that the timing and content of online postings directed to management from individual investors are generally responsive to significant corporate events. Besides information acquisition, individual investors sometimes convey criticisms and suggestions to management. Individual investors collectively turn more active in their online engagements with management when there are signs of weaker external monitoring from institutional investors or weaker managerial incentive alignment with shareholders. Individual investors also tend to step up their engagement efforts after their followed firm experiences poor performance. Additionally, we observe increased engagements by individual investors during securities rules violations and these engagements are associated with sooner enforcement actions on the violations. Our findings suggest that, empowered by a conducive regulatory environment, individual investors could manifest active monitoring incentives when the perceived benefits are sufficiently high.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
你听到人民的呼声了吗?——个人投资者的声音
在监管机构提供一个精心策划的在线平台以促进个人投资者进入管理层的背景下,我们研究了个人股东在与公司管理层互动中的“声音”。我们发现,个人投资者直接向管理层发布在线帖子的时间和内容通常会对重大公司事件做出反应。除了信息获取之外,个人投资者有时也会向管理层提出批评和建议。当有迹象表明机构投资者的外部监督减弱或管理层与股东的激励机制减弱时,个人投资者在与管理层的在线互动中会变得更加积极。个人投资者也倾向于在他们所关注的公司业绩不佳后加大参与力度。此外,我们观察到,在违反证券规则期间,个人投资者的参与度有所增加,而这些参与度与对违规行为采取更快的执法行动有关。我们的研究结果表明,在有利的监管环境下,当感知到的收益足够高时,个人投资者可以表现出积极的监测激励。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
Quality and Product Differentiation: Theory and Evidence from the Mutual Fund Industry Going by the Book: Valuation Ratios and Stock Returns How does the market view shareholder proposals? Quasi-Indexer Ownership and Insider Trading: Evidence from Russell Index Reconstitutions Anomalies in the China A-share Market
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1