Tense

Abstract

What exists is constantly changing. This fact requires that we take tense seriously. Let us say that a statement is a “simple tensed statement” just in case it attributes a propertyF to an individuala (ascribes a relationR to a paira and b) and it is logically equivalent to “ a is now F” (“ a now bearsR to b”). We take tense seriously only if we insist that some simple tensed statements express truths while resisting all attempts at philosophical paraphrase into a tenseless language. Our question is this: Do those who take tense seriously also need to “take tenselessness seriously”? That is, given that we must recognize ineliminably tensed truths in order to make sense of the fact that things change, is there any reason to allow that sometenseless tatements express truths but resist all paraphrase into a tensedidiom? We think not. Consider a statement of the form “ x is F”, in which the “is” cannot be understood as simply present-tensed—for example, “Bolzano is the first to understand continuity”, in which the “historical present tense” is used to describe an event which is obviously not occurring now. What could this tenseless “is” convey, if it is not equivalent to “is now, was, or will be”? Surely the statement implies and is implied by “Bolzano either is, was, or will be the first to understand continuity”. The historical present tense presents those who take tense seriously with no special reason to also take t nselessness seriously. But there are other kinds of statement which have seemed intractably tenseless to some philosophers. Two types are frequently cited: the “eternal truths”, such as that two plus two is four; and truths about the Deity, who is often said to be NOÛS 31:2 (1997) 262–265