The Implications of Strategic Inventory for Short-Term vs. Long-Term Supply Contracts in Non-Exclusive Reselling Environments

Abhishek Roy, S. Gilbert, Guoming Lai
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Problem definition: Although it is well known that a reseller’s ability to hold strategic inventory under a short-term supply contract can potentially benefit both the reseller and a supplier, existing research on strategic inventory focuses almost exclusively on exclusive reselling environments. However, in practice, multiple suppliers often sell to the same nonexclusive reseller, and it is not uncommon for suppliers to ask for future commitments to order quantities from resellers in return for their own commitment to wholesale prices. We investigate how the possibility of strategic inventory influences competing suppliers’ choices between short-term transactional and long-term commitment contracts to a nonexclusive reseller. Methodology/results: Using a game-theoretic model, we consider the interactions between two partially substitutable suppliers and a single, nonexclusive reseller over a two-period horizon in which demand is deterministic. We demonstrate that in nonexclusive reselling environments, where more than one supplier sells its product through the same reseller, the use of strategic inventory under short-term contracts intensifies the price competition between suppliers. We show how this effect can be mitigated when one or both suppliers offer a long-term contract. Moreover, we show that long-term contracts can arise as an equilibrium outcome, particularly when products are more substitutable or holding costs are large. Managerial implications: By considering the interactions between two partially substitutable suppliers and a nonexclusive reseller in a multiperiod setting, we contribute to the literature on strategic contracting and long versus short-term contracts. Our research provides managers with a new explanation, beyond the need to encourage idiosyncratic investments or eliminate the possibility of hold-up, for why long-term contracts may benefit suppliers in practice, who face competition while selling through a nonexclusive reseller.
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非排他性转售环境下战略库存对短期与长期供应合同的影响
问题定义:虽然众所周知,经销商在短期供应合同下持有战略库存的能力对经销商和供应商都有潜在的好处,但现有的关于战略库存的研究几乎完全集中在独家转售环境上。然而,在实践中,多个供应商经常向同一个非独家经销商销售产品,供应商要求经销商承诺未来的订单数量,以换取他们自己对批发价格的承诺,这并不罕见。我们研究了战略库存的可能性如何影响竞争供应商对非独家经销商的短期交易合同和长期承诺合同的选择。方法/结果:使用博弈论模型,我们考虑了两个部分可替代的供应商和一个单一的非排他性经销商之间的相互作用,其中需求是确定的。我们证明了在非排他性转售环境中,当多个供应商通过同一经销商销售其产品时,短期合同下战略库存的使用加剧了供应商之间的价格竞争。我们展示了当一个或两个供应商提供长期合同时,如何减轻这种影响。此外,我们表明,长期合同可以作为一种均衡结果出现,特别是当产品更具可替代性或持有成本较高时。管理意义:通过考虑两个部分可替代的供应商和一个非独家经销商在多期环境下的相互作用,我们为战略合同和长期与短期合同的文献做出了贡献。我们的研究为管理者提供了一个新的解释,超越了鼓励特殊投资或消除拖延的可能性的需要,为什么长期合同在实践中可能有利于供应商,他们在通过非独家经销商销售时面临竞争。
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