Constructing an Architecture of Atrocity

Abstract

The visible participation of paramilitaries in Serbia from 1991 succeeded in simultaneously downplaying the capacity (and intent) of the Serbian irregulars while exaggerating the capabilities of the Croatian or Bosniak opposition. Most importantly, it also elevated the roles played by the (largely imagined) communities. This chapter explains how revisionist history provided an analogy by which the Serbian leadership could falsely equate the Serbian and Bosnian forces, while continuing to exercise command over well-trained, well-equipped irregular units behind the scenes. Throughout the crisis, the Serbian and Bosnian Serb political leaderships offered explanations for the decentralised nature of the violence in Bosnia that exaggerated the presence of paramilitary and irregular units to provide evidence that it was a non-linear, community-based conflict, concealing the calculated political rationale of the organised violence against civilian communities.