A Non-Resolution Limbo: Better Status Quo than Settled? Georgian Territorial Integrity, Russian Security Interests, and the Status of De Facto States in the Peace Process

Elia Bescotti
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Abstract

December 2019 saw the 50th round of the Geneva International Discussions over the conflict in Georgia. The last year has been particularly worrisome in view of the deterioration of the peace process over the administrative boundary lines between Georgia and both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Events such as frequent incidents and blockages due to the borderization process have often claimed lives and create an unpleasant and dangerous situation for the people who attempt to cross the lines for any reason.1 Furthermore, despite the implementation of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms in Gali and Ergneti,2 the negotiation process has not seen any concrete positive development. President of Georgia Salome Zourabichvili criticized the Geneva format, saying that it has only been able to discuss technical issues and has not been oriented towards political questions.3 However, this is hardly surprising, as the decennial deadlock over the resolution of the conflict demonstrates. As in the other unresolved conflict in the post-Soviet space, in particular those where Russia is involved as sponsor or patron state of the de facto governments in the breakaway regions, there are deep misunderstandings, or rather misrecognition of the actual role of the parties involved in the conflict. This plagues the negotiation formats, leading to the lack of a basic framework for a peaceful settlement. Georgia, like Moldova and Ukraine, insists that Russia is the other part of the conflict. Coherent with its sense of territorial integrity, Georgia has thus refused to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent actors since the 2008 war and addresses Moscow as an occupying
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未解决的僵局:现状比解决好?格鲁吉亚领土完整、俄罗斯安全利益和和平进程中事实国的地位
2019年12月,就格鲁吉亚冲突举行了第50轮日内瓦国际讨论。鉴于格鲁吉亚与阿布哈兹和南奥塞梯之间行政分界线的和平进程恶化,去年尤其令人担忧。由于边界化进程造成的频繁事件和封锁等事件经常夺去生命,并为以任何理由试图越过边界的人造成不愉快和危险的情况此外,尽管在加利和厄涅蒂实施了事件预防和反应机制2,但谈判进程没有看到任何具体的积极发展。格鲁吉亚总统萨洛梅·祖拉比奇维利批评日内瓦形式,说它只能讨论技术问题,而没有面向政治问题然而,这并不令人惊讶,因为关于解决冲突的十年僵局表明了这一点。就像在苏联解体后的其他未解决的冲突中一样,特别是在那些俄罗斯作为分裂地区事实上的政府的赞助国或赞助国参与的冲突中,存在着深刻的误解,或者更确切地说,是对冲突各方实际作用的错误认识。这困扰着谈判形式,导致缺乏和平解决的基本框架。与摩尔多瓦和乌克兰一样,格鲁吉亚坚持认为俄罗斯是冲突的另一方。出于其领土完整意识,格鲁吉亚自2008年战争以来一直拒绝承认阿布哈兹和南奥塞梯是独立的行为体,并将莫斯科称为占领者
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OSCE Selected Bibliography 2018/2019 A Non-Resolution Limbo: Better Status Quo than Settled? Georgian Territorial Integrity, Russian Security Interests, and the Status of De Facto States in the Peace Process The 57 OSCE Participating States – Facts and Figures Abbreviations OSCE Conferences, Meetings, and Events 2018/2019
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