To Insure or Not to Insure? Promoting Trust and Cooperation with Insurance Advice in Markets

Ben Grodeck, Franziska Tausch, Erte Xiao, Chengsi Wang
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Abstract

We design a novel insurance advice mechanism aimed at promoting trust and cooperation in markets with asymmetric information. In a buyer-seller game, sellers are given the option to advise buyers on whether to purchase third-party insurance against the potential losses from the opportunistic behavior of strategic sellers. The theoretical model suggests that both cooperative and strategic sellers will advise buyers not to purchase the insurance. Once this advice has been given, strategic sellers are less likely to pursue self-interest due to the associated psychological costs. We conduct a controlled laboratory experiment and show that the insurance advice mechanism significantly increases market efficiency, with sellers being more likely to cooperate with buyers and buyers being more likely to purchase from the seller. Furthermore, we find that the insurance advice mechanism is more effective when sellers can observe buyers’ insurance purchase decisions.
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投保还是不投保?促进保险咨询在市场上的信任与合作
本文设计了一种新的保险咨询机制,旨在促进信息不对称市场中的信任与合作。在买方-卖方博弈中,卖方可以选择建议买方是否购买第三方保险,以防范战略卖方机会主义行为带来的潜在损失。理论模型表明,合作型和战略型卖方都会建议买方不购买保险。一旦给出了这种建议,由于相关的心理成本,战略卖家就不太可能追求自身利益。通过实验室对照实验,我们发现保险咨询机制显著提高了市场效率,卖家更愿意与买家合作,买家更愿意从卖家那里购买。此外,我们发现当卖方能够观察到买方的保险购买决策时,保险建议机制更为有效。
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