"They Did Not Have to Burn My Sister Alive": Causes and Distribution by State of Dowry Murders in India

P. Mayer
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Abstract

Dowry, the money, goods, property, or gifts given by the bride’s family to the groom or his family at the time of marriage, is a common custom in South Asia. Although it is illegal to demand—or offer—a dowry in India, it is a nearly universal custom in many parts of the country. If, after marriage, a husband’s family feels that the wife’s dowry was insufficient, they may harass or inflict other forms of domestic violence on her to put pressure on her family to provide an additional dowry. At its most extreme, this violence may lead to the murder of the wife. An increase in dowry mur-ders, commonly by immolation, in the 1980s and 1990s was reflected in important studies of the phenomenon and changes to the law to prevent the crime. Although the number of dowry murders has grown in succeeding decades, there have been few recent studies; rarer still is research from an all-India perspective. In this paper, I examine trends in and causes of murder for dowry and the related crimes of domestic violence. Prominent theories are tested for their ability to explain the incidence of murder for dowry. Dowry murders are concentrated in north India. Because the marriage alliance systems of the north differ from those of the south, the impact of Indian kinship systems is explored. The multi-generation or ‘joint’ family—nearly universal in India—has been found by Umar to be a common factor in many cases of dowry murder he studied. By contrast, Oldenburg has argued that changes in land tenure during Brit-ish rule created individual property rights for men, leading to a preference for sons and the emergence of demands for dowry and, ultimately, dowry murder. Most case studies of dowry murder have been drawn from India’s larger cities; the impact of urbanisation is also studied. Economists have suggested structural factors, such as population growth, the economic value of women’s work, poverty, income inequality, and conspicuous consumption as possible causes driving domestic violence and murder for dowry. The institutional capacity of an Indian state to provide education, health, and enforcement of laws such as those prohibiting dowry is also examined. This study identifies five principal causes which explain nearly 80% of the variation in dowry murders at the level of individual Indian states: its prevailing kinship system, the prevalence of the joint family, the extent of women’s workforce participation, income inequality, and the institutional performance of a state.
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“他们不必活活烧死我妹妹”:印度嫁妆谋杀案的原因和分布
嫁妆,即新娘家庭在结婚时给新郎或其家人的钱、物品、财产或礼物,是南亚的一种普遍习俗。尽管在印度要求或提供嫁妆是非法的,但在印度的许多地方,这几乎是一种普遍的习俗。如果在结婚后,丈夫的家人觉得妻子的嫁妆不够,他们可能会骚扰或对她施加其他形式的家庭暴力,迫使她的家人提供额外的嫁妆。在最极端的情况下,这种暴力可能导致妻子被谋杀。在20世纪80年代和90年代,嫁妆谋杀的增加,通常是通过自焚的方式,反映在对这一现象的重要研究和对法律的修改中,以防止这种犯罪。尽管嫁妆谋杀的数量在随后的几十年里有所增加,但最近的研究却很少;从全印度角度进行的研究更为罕见。在本文中,我研究了为嫁妆而谋杀的趋势和原因以及相关的家庭暴力犯罪。著名的理论被用来检验其解释嫁妆谋杀发生率的能力。嫁妆谋杀主要集中在印度北部。由于北方的婚姻联盟制度与南方的不同,本文探讨了印度亲属制度的影响。Umar发现,在他研究的许多嫁妆谋杀案件中,多代同堂或“联合”家庭——在印度几乎是普遍存在的——是一个共同因素。相比之下,奥尔登伯格认为,英国统治期间土地所有权的变化为男性创造了个人财产权,导致了对儿子的偏爱,出现了对嫁妆的要求,并最终导致了嫁妆谋杀。大多数关于嫁妆谋杀的案例研究都来自印度的大城市;本文还研究了城市化的影响。经济学家认为,人口增长、女性工作的经济价值、贫困、收入不平等和炫耀性消费等结构性因素可能是导致家庭暴力和为嫁妆而杀人的原因。还审查了印度国家提供教育、卫生和执行诸如禁止嫁妆等法律的体制能力。这项研究确定了五个主要原因,可以解释印度各邦嫁妆谋杀案近80%的差异:其普遍的亲属制度、联合家庭的普遍程度、妇女参与劳动的程度、收入不平等以及一个邦的制度绩效。
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