Manipulation of Self-Interest Perception Can Increase Support for Redistribution: Experimental Evidence Testing the Meltzer and Richard Model

Abstract

Income inequality in the United States has increased in recent decades while public support for redistribution has failed to rise in the same period. These competing trends are often framed as countering a basic expectation in political economy (Metlzer and Richard, 1981). Recent work posits that citizens' lack of accurate information about inequality explains this empirical puzzle. In this paper, I argue that this explanation is insufficient as preferences for redistribution are contingent on the political process whereby taxes are collected and spent. I present evidence from a novel survey experiment where I manipulate a respondent's standing in the income distribution as well as the way in which tax revenues are transferred back to households. When transfers are made such that voters understand the consequences to their net income, they state self-interested demands for redistribution. However, this result is quickly diminished with the introduction of the real-world political process.