Capacity Market Design: Motivation and Challenges in Alberta's Electricity Market

David P. Brown
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

Alberta’s electricity market is currently undergoing a period of substantial transition. The province should proceed with caution as it switches from an energy-only electricity market to a capacity market by 2021. Many other jurisdictions have already made the changeover and Alberta can learn from their experiences in order to avoid common mistakes and pitfalls that can arise with the deployment of a capacity market. There were growing concerns that the existing electricity market structure would not attract sufficient investment from conventional generation (e.g., natural gas) due to the increased penetration of zero marginal cost renewable generation. As a result, the Alberta government has chosen to transition to a capacity market. For consumers, a capacity market aims to ensure there is sufficient investment in new generation capacity to “keep the lights on” and reduce price swings in the wholesale market. The capacity market will also help the province meet its goals for attracting investors and transitioning away from its dependence on coal-fired electricity generation. However, a switchover is not as simple as it sounds. In an energy-only market, firms are paid solely based on the provision of electricity in hourly wholesale markets. In capacity markets, electricity-generating firms are also paid for providing generation capacity, reflecting the potential to provide electricity at some point in the future. While capacity markets can help ensure there is a reliable supply of electricity, there are several challenges in the implementation of capacity markets. This paper discusses the motivation for the adoption of capacity markets, highlights challenges regulators face when implementing this market design in the context of Alberta, and summarizes the key trade-offs associated with energy-only versus capacity market designs. Relative to an energy-only market, a capacity market is more complex and requires that regulators specify numerous parameters that are essential to the functioning of the market. An essential, but often controversial component is the formulation of the capacity demand curve. A capacity demand curve for Alberta has to be carefully designed to deal with uncertainties in demand growth, given that Alberta’s electricity demand is closely interconnected with the ups and downs of global crude oil prices. Consideration must be given to the perspective of outside investors who – as in any area of economic interest – are wary about uncertainty. Political and regulatory uncertainty can undermine the success of a capacity market. This potential for investor hesitancy could result in incumbent firms, familiar with investing in Alberta, seizing a larger share of the market in an already historically concentrated environment. It is critical that policymakers establish a clear and well-defined trajectory for the future of Alberta’s electricity market design as a whole, not just its capacity market. The capacity market is not a panacea for the potential downfalls of an energy-only market. There are trade-offs associated with both energy-only and capacity market designs. Energy-only markets are arguably more economically efficient with cleaner price signals. However, with political constraints on electricity price-spikes and the expansion of renewables, there is more uncertainty in an energy-only market’s ability to promote investment. A capacity market provides more certainty in terms of generation resource adequacy, but at a potentially higher cost. Despite these tradeoffs, capacity markets are unambiguously more complex. This places a heavy burden on regulators to carefully and correctly set critical capacity market parameters that can have substantive impacts on prices and the associated economic signals.
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容量市场设计:艾伯塔省电力市场的动力与挑战
艾伯塔省的电力市场目前正在经历一个重大转型时期。到2021年,该省将从纯能源电力市场转向容量市场,因此应谨慎行事。许多其他司法管辖区已经进行了转变,阿尔伯塔省可以从他们的经验中学习,以避免在部署容量市场时可能出现的常见错误和陷阱。人们越来越担心,由于零边际成本的可再生能源发电日益普及,现有的电力市场结构将无法从传统发电(例如天然气)吸引足够的投资。因此,艾伯塔省政府选择向产能市场过渡。对于消费者而言,容量市场旨在确保有足够的新发电能力投资,以“维持电力供应”,并减少批发市场的价格波动。产能市场也将帮助该省实现吸引投资者和摆脱对燃煤发电的依赖的目标。然而,转换并不像听起来那么简单。在纯能源市场中,企业仅根据每小时批发市场的电力供应获得报酬。在容量市场中,发电公司也因提供发电能力而获得报酬,这反映了未来某一时刻提供电力的潜力。虽然容量市场可以帮助确保可靠的电力供应,但在实施容量市场方面存在一些挑战。本文讨论了采用容量市场的动机,强调了监管机构在阿尔伯塔省实施这一市场设计时面临的挑战,并总结了与仅能源与容量市场设计相关的关键权衡。相对于纯能源市场,容量市场更为复杂,需要监管机构指定许多对市场运作至关重要的参数。一个重要但经常引起争议的组成部分是产能需求曲线的公式。考虑到艾伯塔省的电力需求与全球原油价格的涨跌密切相关,必须仔细设计艾伯塔省的产能需求曲线,以应对需求增长的不确定性。必须考虑外部投资者的观点,与任何经济利益领域一样,他们对不确定性持谨慎态度。政治和监管的不确定性可能会破坏产能市场的成功。这种潜在的投资者犹豫可能会导致熟悉阿尔伯塔省投资的现有公司在历史上已经集中的环境中占据更大的市场份额。至关重要的是,政策制定者要为艾伯塔省电力市场的未来设计建立一个清晰而明确的轨迹,而不仅仅是其容量市场。产能市场并不是解决纯能源市场潜在衰退的灵丹妙药。能源市场设计和容量市场设计都需要权衡取舍。由于价格信号更加清晰,纯能源市场可以说更具经济效率。然而,由于电价飙升和可再生能源扩张受到政治限制,能源市场促进投资的能力存在更多不确定性。容量市场在发电资源充足性方面提供了更多的确定性,但潜在的成本更高。尽管存在这些权衡,但产能市场无疑更为复杂。这给监管机构带来了沉重的负担,他们必须谨慎而正确地设定关键的产能市场参数,这些参数可能对价格和相关的经济信号产生重大影响。
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