A Red Flag for the Licensing Regime (A Postscript to ‘A Red Flag for Hong Kong Credit Ratings’)

S. Johnstone
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Abstract

In July 2011 Moody's Investors Service Hong Kong issued a report that used a system of red flags to highlight corporate governance and accounting risks in a specified population of listed companies. Although the report is not itself a credit rating, it remains unclear whether Moody’s publication of it should be subject to the disciplinary powers of the Securities and Futures Commission (“SFC”). At issue is the construction of section 193(1)(d) of the Securities and Futures Ordinance (“SFO”), which provides that an act or omission relating to the carrying on of a regulated activity is liable to be regarded as misconduct subject to the disciplinary powers of the SFC under section 194 SFO. The earlier determination of the Securities and Futures Appeals Tribunal and the judgment of the Court of Appeal both supported a broad, purposive interpretation of relation to find that the SFC’s disciplinary oversight applied. Moody’s appeal to the Court of Final Appeal is likely to have ramifications that go well beyond the credit rating industry. As the case concerns the interpretation of a disciplinary provision that all regulated persons are subject to, the Court’s ruling will have significant implications on the ambit of the SFC’s disciplinary powers over all companies engaging in regulated activities that require a license from or registration with the SFC. This article examines the approach taken by the Tribunal and the Court of Appeal and suggests it is flawed and ill suited to the complexities of the business environment surrounding the undertaking of regulated activities. In the absence of an acceptable degree of legal and commercial certainty, there is a risk that regulatory oversight of a wide range of activities other than statutorily defined regulated activities may be introduced via a backdoor opened by the prospect of the SFC’s discipline. An alternative view of relation is proposed that may assist develop a test of relation that better serves statutory purposes, as well as regulatory and commercial needs. It is hoped the Court of Final Appeal will take the opportunity to clarify the law in this area in order to facilitate greater certainty as to the extent of the regulatory obligations of licensed corporations as well as the ambit of the SFC’s disciplinary powers.
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发牌制度的红旗(“香港信用评级的红旗”后记)
2011年7月,香港穆迪投资者服务公司(Moody's Investors Service Hong Kong)发布了一份报告,使用了一个红旗系统来突出特定上市公司的公司治理和会计风险。尽管该报告本身并非信用评级,但尚不清楚穆迪公布该报告是否应受到香港证券及期货事务监察委员会(“证监会”)的纪律处分权力的约束。争议的焦点在于《证券及期货条例》(“《证券及期货条例》”)第193(1)(d)条的解释。该条订明,与进行受规管活动有关的作为或不作为,可被视为受证监会根据《证券及期货条例》第194条的纪律处分权力规管的失当行为。证券及期货上诉审裁处较早前的裁定及上诉法院的判决均支持对关系作出宽泛而有目的的解释,以认定证监会的纪律监督适用。穆迪向终审法院提出上诉,其影响可能远远超出信用评级行业。由于本案涉及对所有受规管人士都须遵守的纪律条文的解释,法院的裁决将对证监会对所有从事受规管活动(须向证监会申领牌照或向证监会注册)的公司的纪律处分权力的范围产生重大影响。本文探讨审裁处和上诉法院采取的方法,并指出该方法存在缺陷,不适合从事受规管活动的商业环境的复杂性。在缺乏可接受程度的法律和商业确定性的情况下,存在一种风险,即对法律定义的受监管活动以外的广泛活动的监管监督,可能会通过香港证监会的纪律前景打开的后门引入。提出了另一种关于关系的观点,这种观点可能有助于制定一种更好地服务于法定目的以及监管和商业需要的关系检验方法。我们希望终审法院能借此机会澄清这方面的法律,以便更明确持牌法团的规管责任范围,以及证监会纪律处分权力的范围。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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